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STATUTORY MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION OF
CORPORATIONS
FoR over a hundred years, corporations in the United States have tended
to unite into larger forms of organization. In the various periods in which
this tendency has been most pronounced, the motives for, and the forms of
combination have frequently been quite different. In the period prior to
1900, the desire to monopolize was the principal motivating force, later it
was the economies of large-scale production, and most recently it appears to
be the advantages of large-scale marketing. The forms of combination have
included pools, trusts, interlocking directorates, leases, holding companies, sales
of entire corporate assets, and statutory merger or consolidation.' Of these,
1. B]3ucman, Cop 0rroN FnrAZcE (1934) c. 16; Owrrs, Busmss Onn&zmhmAo.r ua.,
Co-aiNATION (1934) c. 11; Thorp, The Persistence of the Merger Movement (1931) 21
A2L Ec. Rxv. Supp. 77. Compare motives and factors leading to the recent role of azets
by the Corrigan, McKinney Steel Company to the Republic Steel Corporation. N. Y. Times,
Sept. 24, 1935, at 35, col. 1; Business Week, Sept. 1, 1934, at 27.
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the device of statutory merger or consolidation is among the oldest, having
had its origin in state statutes in the eighteen-twenties. It has since been
consistently used up to the present, during which time the legislatures and
courts have combined to attach to merger and consolidation peculiar legal
incidents and attributes which make them forms of combination strikingly
unlike any other.
2
While it is not uncommon to treat the terms merger and consolidation as
synonymous, at the present time the tendency is to regard each as represent-
ing a distinct type of combination. Thus, merger signifies the absorption of
one or more existing corporations by another existing corporation which retains
its corporate identity; its rights, privileges, franchises and properties, how-
ever, being enlarged to the extent of the rights, privileges, franchises and
properties of the absorbed corporations, whose existence thereupon terminates.0
Consolidation, on the other hand, is the unification of two or more existing
corporations into a new corporate entity which has the combined rights,
privileges, franchises and properties of the original or constituent corporations,
all of which lose their corporate existences. 4  These technical meanings have
gradually evolved over the period of years since the origin of statutory merger
and consolidation. In some statutes the distinction between the two has been
recognized for a comparatively long time, in others it has been made very
recently, while in still others the two terms continue to be used loosely and
interchangeably.5 But despite the fact that the two terms are still used inter-
2. However, save for the period prior to 1860, the merger and consolidation device has
never been the most widely used form of combination. The likelihood of increase in its use
today is considered infra, p. 133.
3. See Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 937, 939 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932);
News Publishing Co. v. Blair, 29 F. (2d) 955, 958 (App. D. C. 1928); Fordyce v. Helverng,
76 F. (2d) 431, 434 (App. D. C. 1935); State v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co. 202 Ala. 558,
560, 81 So. 60, 62 (1918); Graeser v. Phoenix Finance Co., 218 Iowa 1112, 1121, 254 N. W.
859, 864 (1934); 15 FLETcHER, PRIVATE ComwoRA7AoNs (rev. ed. 1932) § 7041; 8 TnouPsou,
CoapoRaTioNs (3d ed. 1927) § 6012; Field, Nature of and Procedure for Direct Property
Owning Consolidations (1933) 5 RocKY MT. L. REV. 230, 231.
4. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 188, 190 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932) ; Carolina Coach Co. v. Hartness, 198 N. C. 524, 528, 152 S. E. 489, 491 (1930) ;
Collinsville Nat. Bank v. Esau, 74 Okla. 45, 47, 176 Pac. 514, 516 (1918); Union Indemnity
Co. v. Railroad Comm., 187 Wis. 528, 536, 205 N. W. 492, 495 (1925); also the cases and
authorities cited supra, note 3. The term amalgamation is used by financial writers In
preference to consolidation, to indicate the narrow sense in which it is being used. See
OwE s, op. cit. supra note 1, at 368.
5. Examples of statutes which do not distinguish between merger and consolidation
include ALA. CoDp ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 7037; CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 3462, 3465;
N C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1224(a). The Federal Banking Act uses the term
"consolidation" but provides only for merger. 44 STAT. 1224 (1927), as amended 48 STAT.
190 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 34a (1934). Courts as well are prone to use the two inter-
changeably. See in re Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 540, 147 At. 606, 607 (1929). Some
courts recognize the distinction, but refuse to apply it as too technical. See Jewett City
Savings Bank v. Board of Equalization, 116 Conn. 172, 182, 164 Ati. 643, 646 (1933). For
a suggestion that in the future the tendency will be to disregard the distinction, see
BuRTcn"rE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 765 n. 1.
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changeably the distinction is an important one, and becomes highly significant
in certain cases.
Nevertheless, while merger and consolidation differ from each other in this
fundamental respect, they have so many features in common that they are
ordinarily treated together as a single type of device for combination, as dis-
tinguished from other means of combination which also result in bringing sev-
eral existing corporations under one common control.7  Most similar to the
merger and consolidation device is the combination effected in the case where
one corporation sells all of its assets to a second corporation in return for
stock, after which the selling corporation distributes the stock received to its
stockholders and then formally dissolves. Although merger and consolidation
is strictly statutory and a sale of assets is essentially contractual, as a prac-
tical matter in a given case it may be extremely difficult to decide whether the
device employed was merger and consolidation or a sale of assets inasmuch
as today, the latter also usually follows a statutory procedure 8 Nevertheless,
the statutory procedure of effecting a merger or consolidation is different from
that of a sale of assets, and different incidents ensue upon following the
different procedures. Both of these factors may serve to distinguish them.
Thus, for example, in merger and consolidation, all the participating corpora-
tions, save the surviving corporation in the case of merger, lose their corporate
identities by virtue of the transaction itself, while upon a sale of assets the
selling corporation retains its corporate identity until some formal dissolution
6. Organization taxes, federal jurisdiction, and special privileges and exemptions, are
instances in which the distinction becomes important. See infra p. 128.
7. Where only one corporation is involved as in a reorganization, the process can scarcely
be termed a device for combination. In this connection, however, notice should be taken
of the expanded meaning given mergef and consolidation in the Revenue Act of 1924, 43
STAT. 257 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 934 (h) (1) (A) (1928). In the Revenue Act of 1934,
48 STAT. 705 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 112 (g) (1) (A) (1935), statutory merger and con-
solidation seems to be confined to its true meaning, although still designated as a type of
reorganization for the purposes of the Act. Cf. also Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932), aff'd 287 U. S. 462 (1933); Ahles
Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Helvering v. Winston
Bros. Co., 76 F. (2d) 381 (C. C. A. Sth, 1935); Comment (1935) 45 Y,. L. J. 134.
8. In the absence of a statutory procedure, a prosperous corporation may alvays sell
all its assets and dissolve when all the stockholders consent. In some jurisdictions this
could be done by majority consent. See Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Under-
takings (1916) 30 HARv. L. R v. 335; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 908. At the present time
statutory provisions in forty states authorize sales of entire corporate assets on the consent
of proportions of stockholders varying from a majority to four-fifths. But this statutory
procedure is usually quite distinct from that of the merger and consolidation statutes, and
the objects of a sale of assets are quite outside the purposes of the merger and consolidation
statutes. See Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 937, 939 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932). There must usually be an intent to follow the merger or consolidation statute.
Blackstone v. Chandler, 15 Del. Ch. 1, 130 At. 34 (Ch. 1925); Graeser v. Phoenix Finance
Co., 218 Iowa 1112, 254 N. W. 859 (1934); Beardstown Pearl Button Co. v. Oswald, 130
Il. App. 290 (1906). However, the fact that courts will frequently call a sale of assets a
merger or consolidation complicates the problem. See United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N. D. Ohio, 1935); cf. Polk County Lumber Co. v. Dwiggns, 1CD
Fla. 559, 129 So. 859 (1930).
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process has been carried out; and in merger and consolidation no instruments
are necessary to pass title, but in a sale of assets deeds and bills of sale must
be used.9 More easily distinguishable from the process of merging and con-
solidating by reason of the procedure followed and incidents attaching thereto,
are the processes employed to bring corporations under common control by
means of a sale of assets in return for cash or obligations of the purchasing
corporation,' 0 by means of a holding company," and of long term leases by
one corporation of all the properties of another corporation.1
2
The Process of Merger or Consolidation. Statutory authorization is essen-
tial before a merger or consolidation may be effected, and an attempt to merge
or consolidate without such authorization is an absolute nullity; not even a
de facto surviving or consolidated corporation is formed.' 3 It has been funda-
mental from the very origin of the merger and consolidation device that the
general grant of corporate powers does not constitute a sufficient authorization;
there must be an express grant by the legislature to each of the corporations
wishing to participate in the merger or consolidation. This grant may exist
in a special or general act, in the corporate charter, or by virtue of special
legislative confirmation of a previously unauthorized merger or consolidation. 14
9. Other points of difference are* that in merger and consolidation, the plan by which
the stockholders exchange their shares in the constituents for shares in the surviving or con-
solidated corporation is part of the merger or consolidation agreement; in a sale of ascts
the distribution of the shares received is not part of the sale contract. The stockholders of
each corporation participating in a merger and consolidation, must give their approval, but
in a sale of assets only the stockholders of the selling corporation must consent. In merger
and consolidation the surviving or consolidated corporation will be liable for the debts,
liabilities, and obligations of the constituents, usually by express statutory imposition; in
a sale of assets such statutory imposition is exceedingly rare. Hills, Consolidation of Cor-
porations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares (1931) 19 CAx . L. Rav. 349. But the
vendee corporation in the latter case may be held liable on other grounds. See infra note 95.
10. Drovers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 260 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 4th,
1919); Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
11. Bee Bldg. Co. v. Daniel, 57 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Coudon v. Talt, 56
F. (2d) 208 (D. Md. 1932); cf. Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E.
949 (1913); Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Corm,, 79 Mont. 269, 2S6 Pac.
373 (1927).
12. State v. Montana Ry. Co., 21'Mont. 221, 53 Pac. 623 (1898); cf. Black v. St. Louis
& S. F. Rr. Co., 110 Mo. App. 198, 85 S. W. 96 (1905).
13. Gott v. Live Poultry Transit Co., 17 Del. Ch. 288, 153 At. 801 (Ch. 1931); Ameri-
can Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota & N. W. Rr. Co., 157 I11. 641, 42 N. E. 153 (1895);
First State Bank of Mangum v. Lock, 113 Okla. 30, 237 Pac. 606 (1925).
14. Pearce v. Madison & I. Rr. Co. and Peru & I. Rr. Co., 21 Hbw. 441 (U. S. 1858);
Mead v. New York, Housatonic & Northern Rr. Co., 45 Conn. 199 (1877); Gunggoll v,
Outer Drive Athletic Club, 349 I1. 406, 182 N. E. 409 (1932); State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46
(1861) ; Riker & Son v. United Drug Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 580, 82 Atl. 930 (Ct. Errors and App.
1912); New York & Sharon Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 7 Wend. 412 (N. Y. 1831); Jones v.
Rhea, 130 Va. 345, 107 S. E. 814 (1921). The power to merge or consolidate cannot be implied
from the power to dissolve. Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 Pac,
1044 (1928); Doe Run Lead Co. v. Maynard, 283 Mo. 646, 223 S. W. 600 (1920). Where
a consolidation agreement was entered into prior to the repeal of the statute and the
stockholders' approval was obtained thereafter, the consolidation was held valid. Cameron
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At the time the merger and consolidation device originated, corporations
were created solely by special legislative acts. Consequently, the earliest
sources of the power to merge or consolidate were also special acts. When the
lines of two railroads or canals happened to connect, the advantages to be
derived from a single continuous line under unified control appear to have first
suggested the use of merger or consolidation, and special acts authorizing
such were passed.' 5 These early acts were invariably brief, simply authoriz-
ing the corporations involved to "unite" their capital stocks10 or interests,' 7
or they merely stated that the stockholders of one corporation were thereby
constituted stockholders of the second corporation, and vice-versa.18 As
railroads expanded, their incorporators began to foresee that authority to merge
or consolidate might be useful, so at their instigation, legislatures often
included this power in the original charter.'0
The first general statute authorizing the consolidation of railroads was
passed in Indiana in 1853,2 and soon thereafter similar general statutes were
enacted in most of the states in which railroads had become important.2 ' As
v. N. Y. & ft. Vernon Water Co., 133 N. Y. 336, 31 N. E. 104 (1892). Where merger
and consolidation are recognized as distinct, authority to merge is no authority to con-
solidate, and vice-versa. Adams v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley Rr. Co., 77 Mis. 194, 24 So. 203
(1898). But cf. Meyer v. Johnston & Stewart, 64 Ala. 603 (1879); Chicago, S. F. & C. Ry.
Co. v. Ashling, 160 Ill. 373, 43 N. E. 373 (1896).
15. It has been suggested that the merger or consolidation device originated in connection
with turnpike roads. Bisbee, Consolidaton and Merger, 8 Lcruas os. Lrnsr, Toprcs
(1931) 365, 368; Owairs, op. cit. sipr a note 1, at 369. But it seems that the advent of the
railroad, and to a lesser degree, that of the canal, was the beginning of this method of
combination, at least insofar as true statutory merger and consolidation are concerned. A
survey of the statutes of Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Virginia for the period from 1820 to 1850 indicates that the number of
grants of power to merge and consolidate to railroads far exceeded those to any other
corporations, and the statutes granting this power to turnpike companies, in particular, are
very few.
16. E. g. DeL. Laws 1833, c. 241; Pa. Laws 1837, No. 1; N. . Acts 1853, c. g0.
17. E. g. Pa. Laws 1832, No. 68, § 4.
18. E. g. Mass. Laws 1827, c. 74, § 1; Mass. Laws 1840, c. 50, § 1. 'Union" or "unite"
were the terms most commonly used in these early statutes, and while "consolidate" oc-
casionally appeared, the term "merge" was rarely used. E. g. Did. Laws 18S4, c. 250, § 1; N.
J. Acts 1831, p. 124, § 1; N. Y. Laws 1850, c. 236, § 1; Pa. Laws 1832, No. 63, § 4. Where
the corporations were of different states a grant of authority from each legislature was
necessary, each one making its own grant dependent on the other legislatures making similar
grants. E. g. Del. Laws 1835, c. 9, § 1; Va. Acts 1848, c. 146, § 3. This type of legisla-
tion is within the powers of the respective legislatures and does not involve extra-territorial
legislation. Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wail. 65, 82 (U. S. 1870); Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.
S. 436 (1894); Alabama City, G. & A. Ry. Co. v. Kyle, 202 Ala. 552, 81 So. 54 (1918);
Boardman v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 84 N. Y. 157 (1881); see Mackay v. N. Y., N.
H. & H. Rr. Co., 82 Conn. 73, 90, 72 At. 583, 589 (1909).
19. E. g. Del. Laws 1831, c. 83, § 24; Mass. Acts & Resolves 1844, c. 134, § 6; N. Y.
Laws 1836, c. 262, § 11.
20. Ind. Laws 1853, c. 85.
21. See Ill. Laws 1854, p. 9; Ohio Acts 1856, p. 143; N. Y. Laws 1869, c. 917; S. C.
Acts 1870, No. 232. The Ohio statute of 1856 was in many respects sihlar to the
ordinary merger and consolidation statutes of today.
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industrial and business corporations grew in importance, general merger or
consolidation statutes were passed in relation to them. At first the privilege
was usually extended only to such corporations as were engaged in the same
or similar business, but today this restriction has largely disappeared save
in connection with public utility corporations, insurance companies, and banks
and trust companies. 22  At the present time, thirty-three states have what
might be called general statutes authorizing merger or consolidation, or both,3
while in the remainder of the states a special act would still be necessary to
effectuate this type of combination.24 Of those states having general merger
or consolidation statutes, thirteen seem to confine the power to mergers or
consolidations of domestic corporations with other domestic corporations,-
and while the other twenty expressly authorize domestic corporations to merge
or consolidate with corporations of other states, at least three of these require
that the surviving or consolidated corporation shall be a corporation of that
state only.26  Several general statutes allow merger or consolidation of cor-
porations of their state with federal corporations.
2 7
Practically all statutes require as an initial step that a joint agreement be
22. E. g. CoN. GzN. STAT. (1930) § 3462; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, 9
33; N. Y. STocx: Coae. LAW (1923) § 85, §1, as amended, N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 441, § 15
(merger only). As to what is the same or similar kind of business, see Colgate v.
United States Leather Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 229, 72 AtI. 126 (Ct. Errors and App. 1909); York
Haven Water & Power Co. v. Public Service Comm. 287 Pa. 241, 134 AtI. 419 (1926); cf.
Neff v. Gas & Electric Shop, 232 Ky. 66, 22 S. W. (2d) 265 (1929).
23. The remaining states, however, often have merger or consolidation statutes in respect
to certain classes of corporations, such as railroads, banks, insurance companies. E. g. Miss.
CODE ANx. (1930) §§ 6082, 6105, sanctioning merger and consolidation of railroad com-
panies. A recent tendency is to enact general merger and consolidation statutes for non-
profit corporations, which as a general rule do not fall within the ordinary merger and
consolidation statute. E. g. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, § 188a; PA. STAT.
AN'. (Purdon, 1934) tit. 15, § 2851-801.
24. However, in those states having no merger or consolidation statutes, substantially
similar results can be attained by a sale of assets or some other device. The absence of a
merger or consolidation statute does not indicate that a state has a policy against attaining
the practical results of merger or consolidation by another device. J. H. Lane & Co. v.
Maple Cotton Mills, 226 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
25. Connecticut, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia. However, in
those thirteen states, certain special classes of corporations, particularly railroads, may have
the power to merge or consolidate with railroad corporations of other states.
26. The twenty states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. Of these, statutes In
Kentucky, Maine, Virginia, and possibly Montana require that the surviving or con-
solidated corporation shall be a corporation of that state only. In New Jersey, there
may be some doubt as to whether the consolidated corporation can become a corporation
of any state other than New Jersey. See N. J. CosoP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) tit. 47, § 104.
27. E. g. Ark. Laws 1031, c. 255, § 67; TEENi. CoDE ANx. (Williams, 1934) § 3755. How-
ever, this situation is usually dealt with under the banking statutes, for the case most




drawn up by the boards of directors of the corporations desiring to merge
or consolidate, setting forth the "terms and conditions of the merger or con-
solidation," and the "mode of carrying the same into effect."28  It is at this
stage of the process of effecting a merger or consolidation that many of the
most difficult problems are encountered. Originally, negotiations preparatory
to the drawing up of the joint agreement were conducted by committees of
the boards of directors of the corporations, or occasionally by the boards
themselves. -9  Today, however, this intermediate role frequently will be filled
by professional promoters or groups of investment bankers, in which case it is
desirable but not essential that they have no interest in any one corporation.
At this stage of the proceedings, from the point of view of those promoting
the transaction, the prevention of the formation of any dissentient groups,
either among the stockholders or the managements of the constituent corpora-
tions, is extremely important, for once formed, such groups may be able
materially to impede the progress of the merger or consolidation, and possi-
bly even to prevent its completion.3' This problem is obviated, of course;
where a holding company undertakes to merge or consolidate a number of its
wholly owned subsidiaries, and in such a case merger or consolidation becomes
little more than a matter of drafting an agreement which will accomplish the
desired purposes. But where the holding company owns only a controlling
interest in the subsidiaries, care must be taken so that the agreement will not
prejudice the interests of minority stockholders, for otherwise such stockhold-
ers may be able to enjoin the transaction.
32
In preparation of the agreement of merger or consolidation, the principal
problem concerns a basis for the exchange of shares which will properly
reflect the relative rights, privileges, and interests of the stockholders of the
constituents in the surviving or consolidated corporation. This basis should
be such that the stockholders of each constituent will receive an amount of
stock of the surviving or consolidated corporation proportionate to the value of
the contribution which their constituent is making to the surviving or con-
solidated corporation. In valuing these contributions, two elements are usually
to be considered: the net assets and the earning power of each constituent. In
order to evaluate net assets and earning power properly, they must be exam-
ined from a uniform accounting approach, thus eliminating discrepancies
which might arise from different methods and rates of depredation, from dif-
ferent ways of determining costs, and from other sources. Once the contri-
butions have been valued, the particular manner in which the shares are
exchanged depends on the circumstances of each individual case, although
28. E. g. DEL. REv. CODE (1915) § 1973, as amended Del. Laws 1929, c. 135, § 18; N.
J. Comp. STAr. (1911) tit. 47, § 105.
29. See Smas, THE BEGInrNNGs 0r THE NEW YoRE CEazn= RAnxo.%D (1920) c. 17.
30. See Owaqs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 372.
31. See Field, Holding Corporation Control as a Provisional Form of Consolidation
(1932) 8 J. LAND & PuB. UTm. Ec. 87, 89; Business Week, Sept. 21, 1929, at 22.
32. Field, supra note 31, at 87. Among the suggested advantages of the balding company
as an intermediate step in the merger and consolidation process are the elimination of
opposition by corporate officers and minority stockholders, of difficulties of negotiating com-
parative values, and of harmonizing corporate constituents.
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a common practice is for the surviving or consolidated corporation to issue
preferred stock to represent the contributions of net assets, and common stock
te represent the prospective earnings which are expected to accrue as a result
of the transaction. 8
Provisions for secured and unsecured creditors of the constituents normally
give rise to few problems at the agreement stage. Today all statutes expressly
protect such groups, and the ordinary procedure is simply for the surviving or
consolidated corporation to assume all debts, liabilities, and obligations in the
agreement of merger or consolidation. 84 However, in regard to bonded indebt-
edness, in the interest of simplicity in financial structure it may be desirable to
provide for an exchange of bonds of the surviving or consolidated corporation
for the bonds of the constituents which are outstanding.80 Since the value
of a bondholder's interest is usually ascertainable, an exchange of bonds
involves but few difficulties, and in the absence of any impairment of his
security, the bondholder will generally find it desirable to make the exchange.
After the joint agreement of merger or consolidation has been consummated,
the statutes require its submission for approval or rejection to the stockholders
of each corporation participating in the transaction, frequently at a meeting
called specially for that purpose.86 In the earliest mergers and consolidations
the principles became firmly established that a stockholder of a constituent
corporation could not be forced to become a stockholder of the surviving
or consolidated corporation,3 7 and that the unanimous consent of the stock-
holders was necessary to effectuate a merger or consolidation, unless some pro-
vision for approval by a lesser proportion could be read into the contract
between the constituent corporation and its stockholders.38  The basis of both
33. See 2 Fn=Nry, Psm.Rcxprs OF ACCOUNTmG (1924) c. 47; GmsTmMEo, FmNc-Az.
COMBINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF BUSInNESS (1924) c. 29; KsTER, ADvANcw AccouNTIu
(3d rev. ed. 1933) c. 30.
34. See Rights and Remedies of Creditors, infra p. 122.
35. BUaRCrr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 774. Problems in connection with bonds which
may arise in drafting the agreement of merger or consolidation include: (1) Where by the
/ terms of the trust indentures of the mortgages of the constituents, the after-acquired prop-
city clauses will operate so as to extend the liens of those mortgages to the property which
the surviving or consolidated corporation may thereafter acquire. To avoid confusion In
the future from overlapping liens, it may be possible to provide for the replacement of the
old bonds with new ones. (2) Where a constituent has outstanding bonds convertible into
stock at the option of the holder, if the conversion instrument is such that the surviving or
consolidated corporation will be required to convert bonds into stock in accordance with
the terms of exchange of the merger or consolidation agreement, it is desirable to make
some provision for setting aside stock for this purpose.
36. E. g. ILL. Rav. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, §§ 157.63, 157.64; N. Y.
STocK CORP. LAW (1923) § 86 (8) (b).
37. Booe v. Junction Rr. Co., 10 Ind; 93 (1857); Lauman v. Lebanon Valley Rr. Co.,
30 Pa. 42 (1858).
38. Nugent v. The Supervisors, 19 Wall. 241 (U. S. 1873); In re Interborough Consolidated
Corp. 277 Fed. 455 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Botts v. Simpsonville & B. C. Turnpike Road
Co., 88 Ky. 54, 10 S. W. 134 (1888); Kirby v. Saginaw Hotels Co., 253 Mich. 308, 235 N.




propositions seems to have been that a merger or consolidation involved such
a radical change in the nature and extent of the corporate enterprise to which
the stockholder had subscribed, that it amounted to an impairment of the obli-
gation of the contract between the stockholder and the corporation.P Since
the requirement of unanimous consent greatly diminished the utility of the
device, at an early period statutes began to provide for merger or consolida-
tion by a lesser proportion of stockholders. 40 If this statute was in exist-
ence when a stockholder subscribed to stock, the statute became part of the
contract, and thereafter, while he still could not be forced to become a stock-
holder in the surviving or consolidated corporation,4 1 he could no longer pre-
vent the stipulated proportion of stockholders from bringing about a merger
or consolidation.4a Today the statutes provide for approval by proportions
of total shares outstanding varying from a simple majority in some states to
two-thirds and three-fourths in others. 3 By some statutes only voting stock
is entitled to vote on the question, 4 in one the transaction is regarded as
39. Mowrey v. Indianapolis & C. Rr. Co., 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9, 891, p. 930 (C. C. D.
Ind. 1866); Botts v. Simpsonville & B. C. Turnpike Road Co., 88 Ky. S4, 10 S. W. 134
(1888) ; see Mills v. Central Rr. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 1, 4, 2 Atl. 453, 454 (Ch. 1886). CoW=ra:
Mayfield v. Alton Ry., Gas & Electric Co., 198 IIl. $28, 65 N. E. 100 (1902). 9
40. E. g. Mass. Acts & Resolves 1849, c. 223, § 11 (majority); N. J. Acts 1831, p. 124,
§ 1 (seven-eighths); Pa. Laws 1856, No. 197, § 3 (two-thirds).
41. _McCray v. Junction Rr. Co., 9 Ind. 358 (1857); Patterson v. Shattuch Arizona
Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611, 244 N. W. 281 (1932); Iaurnn v. Lebanon Valley Rr. Co.,
30 Pa. 42 (1858); cf. Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 45S (Ch.
1873). Nor will the clause in the merger and consolidation statute, providing that in the
absence of an express objection, a stockholder will be deemed to have assented to the
tiansaction, having the effect of making such stockholder a stockholder in the surviving or
consolidated corporation against his will. Rivers v. McIntire, 160 S. C. 462, 158 S. E. 816
(1931); Rivers v. Stevenson, 169 S. C. 422, 169 S. E. 135 (1933).
42. Norton v. Union Traction Co., 183 Ind. 666 110 N. E. 113 (1915); Colgate v. U.
S. Leather Co., 73 N . J. Eq. 72, 67 Ati. 657 (Ch. 1907); see Jones v. Miusouri-Edhon Elec.
Co., 144 Fed. 765, 770 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906). It also seems that a reserved power by the
legislature to alter or amend corporate characters will be available to permit a merger or
consolidation, though no express power existed at the time the stockholders subzcribed.
Market St. Ry. Co. v. Heliman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225 (1895); Bingham v. Savings
Investment & Trust Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 413, 138 At. 659 (1927); Winfree v. River-ide
Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717, 75 S. E. 309 (1912). However, some courts have held thLs
ieservation of power insufficient to authorize so radical a change in the corporate enter-
prise. Botts v. Simpsonville & B. C. Turnpike Road Co., 88 Ky. 54, 10 S. W. 134
(1888); Kenosha, Rockford & Rock Island Rr. Co. v. Marnsh, 17 Wis. 13 (1863).
43. E. g. CoLo. Coam. STAT. (1921) § 2287 (three-fourths); FLA. Corn'. Gm.-. Lm.,s
Aa.-x. (1927) § 6562 (majority); M HIC. orm. L.ws (Mason Supp. 1933) § 10135-S2 (two-
thirds); Anm. SrAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7457-12 (nine-tenths); Mo. STAT. A rs.. (Vernon,
1932) § 4954 (three-fifths). As a general rule the required proportion must be of the
total capital stock outstanding, though the Virginia statute seems to require only that there
be approval by a majority of the votes cast. VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 3822(b). In
some states if the articles of incorporation provide for approval by a l-ser proportion than
that named in the statute, the statute provides that the former shall prevail. Mnu:. Sr,r.
(Mason, 1927) § 7457-12; OHro Gmz. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 8623-67.
44. E. g. ImL. REv. STAT. Aimx. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, § 157.64; N. Y. Srocx Co.2.
LAw (1923) § 86 (8) (b); WAsH. REv. STAT. Av.. (Remington, 1935) § 3803-43 (2);
1935]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
so fundamental a change that all the stock, preferred, common, or otherwise,
is given the right to vote.45  Where there are classes of stock, all of which are
entitled to vote, the vote is taken by classes and the required proportion in
each class must approve.
46
After the approval by the stockholders of the constituent corporations, it
is usually required that articles of merger or consolidation be filed with the
secretary of state in the state or states of which the constituents had been
corporations. A not infrequent provision today, particularly in respect to
public utility and railroad companies, is to make the approval of some state
regulatory board or commission a condition precedent to the filing of these
articles. 47 More recently the federal government has imposed similar restric-
tions on corporations engaged in interstate commerce. 48  Once the articles have
been filed, the merger or consolidation is regarded as complete and it is
effective forthwith.49
The Rights and Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders. Two courses of
action are open to ihe dissenting stockholder who does not wish to become
a stockholder in the surviving or consolidated corporation. First, if the merger
or consolidation has not yet become effective, he may seek by injunction to
prevent it from ever taking effect, or if it has been completed, he may ask
equity to set it aside. Secondly, he may sue for the value of his interest in
the constituent corporation represented by his shares of stock.50
To have a standing in equity to enjoin a merger or consolidation, the dis-
senting stockholder must usually have been a stockholder at the time the
merger or consolidation agreement was submitted to the stockholders of his
UNITORM BusnEss CORP. Acv § 44. In many statutes, simply the term "stockholders" is
used, without any express designation one way or the other. E. g. Dx.. REV. Con (1915)
§ 1973, as amended Del. Laws 1929, c. 135, § 18; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 3822 (b).
45. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 361 (3). Some merger and consolidation
statutes require that notice be given to all stockholders, though only the voting stock is
entitled to vote to approve or reject the agreement. FLA. Com. GEN. LAws ANN. (1927)
§ 6562; Txa-w. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 3750.
46. E. g. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 361 (3); LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart 1932) §
1128; PA. STAT. ANNi. (Purdon, 1934) tit. 15, § 2852-902 (c).
47. E. g. Omro GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 710-86 (banks); PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, 1931) tit. 66, § 182 (c) (public service corporations). However, in Virginia the ap-
proval of the corporation commission is essential to the merger or consolidation, of any
corporations. VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 3822 (b).
48. E. g. P. L. No. 333, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) § 203 (a) (public utilities). For
problems arising under the Transportation Act of 1920, requiring the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to promulgate the plan of consolidation, see Snyder v. New York,
Chicago, and St. Louis Rr. Co., 118 Ohio St. 72, 160 N. E. 615 (1928).
49. E. g. ILL. REv. STAT. ANw. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, § 157.67; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1934) tit. 15, § 2892-906.
50. See infra p. 120. One other possible situation may arise where an individual who
has been a stockholder in a constituent, through no fault of his own, fails to obtain stock
in the surviving or consolidated corporation. In such a case he may compel the surviving
o, consolidated corporation to transfer stock to him. Cf. Seymour v. Mechanics & Metals
Nat. Bank, 199 App. Div. 707, 192 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1st Dep't., 1922), where in 1922 the
complainant was held entitled to his shares, although the first of several mergers and con-
solidations took place in 1855.
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constituent for their approval,5 x he must not have voted in favor of the agree-
ment,52 and his application for relief must be timely. The latter is of special
importance, for in their dislike of suits by minority stockholders, the courts
often seize upon any indication of laches as a ground for denying injunctive
relief.5 3 If it appears to the court that the bill is a mere "strike suit" by
which the dissenting stockholder is trying to blackmail the constituent into
settling his claim, it is likely that he will be relegated to his action for the
value of his sharesP 4  If the dissenting stockholder is seeking only to enjoin
or set aside the merger or consolidation, his bill is sufficient if it is directed
against his constituent alone, but if the complainant asks for relief in the
alternative, that is, an injunction or if that be denied, the value of his shares,
the surviving or consolidated corporation must be joined as a party defend-
ant. 5 The action is regarded as one by the dissenting stockholder in his own
right, and it seems to be unnecessary to allege or prove a demand upon the
officers of the corporation to prevent the merger or consolidation, since under
the circumstances this would be virtually a useless procedure5 0 Finally, to
complete his standing in equity, the complainant must show that his remedy
51. Norton v. Union Traction Co., 183 Ind. 666, 110 N. E. 113 (1915); cf. Cooper v.
Central Alloy Steel Corp., 43 Ohio App. 455, 183 N. E. 439 (1931). Contra: PolUtz v.
Gould, 202 N. Y. 11, 94 N. E. 1088 (1911).
52. Carr v. Rochester Tumbler Co., 207 Pa. 392, 56 At. 945 (194). But where at the
time of the stockholders' meeting, the complainant did not know of fraud on the part of
the promoters of the transaction, and had no means of knowing it, he may later sek to
enjoin the merger or consolidation. Alabama Fidelity Mortgage & Bond. Co. v. Dubberly,
198 Ala. 545, 73 So. 911 (1917); cf. Cole v. Nat. Cash Credit Ass'n., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156
At. 183 (1931).
53. Rankin v. Interstate Equities Corp., 180 AUt. 541 (Del. Ch. 1935); Bradford v.
Frankfort, St. Louis & Toledo Rr. Co., 142 Ind. 383, 40 N. E. 741 (1895); Dana v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 44, 65 AUt. 730 (Ch. 1907); cf. Cole v. Birmingham Union
Ry. Co., 143 Ala. 427, 39 So. 403 (1905); Auten v. St. Louis, Iron Mt. & Southern Ry.
Co., 110 Ark. 24, 160 S. W. 873 (1913); Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1869).
54. See Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 543, 551, 138 AU. 772, 775
(Ch. 1927); cf. Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1308.
55. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Ml. S. Ry. Co., 260 'U. S. 261 (1922); Jones
v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Bonner v. Terre Haute &
I. Rr. Co., 151 Fed. 985 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907); Luehrmann v. Lincoln Trust & Title Co.,
192 S. W. 1026 (Mo. 1917); cf. Alabama Fidelity Mortgage & Bond Co. v. Dubberly, 193
Ala. 545, 73 So. 911 (1917). A court of equity will frequently grant the complainant the
value of his shares in lieu of enjoining or setting aside the transaction. This is particularly
true as to the latter, since interminable confusion might ensue. Dana v. American Tobacco
Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 44, 65 At. 730 (Cl. 1907), aWd 73 N. J. Eq. 736, 69 At]. 223 (Ct. Errors
and App. 1908). Another influential factor in deciding what relief to give may be the
size of the complainant's interest. This is especially true at the pre-ent time when the
tendency of the courts seems to be to prevent dictation of corporate policies by minority
interests. MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396
(Ch. 1928); Paterson v. Shattuck-Arizona Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611, 244 N. W. 281
(1932); cf. Tanner v. Lindell Ry. Co., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S. W. 155 (1904).
56. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Rr. Co., 250 Fed. 160 (C. C. A.
6th, 1918).
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at law is inadequate,5 7 and establish some ground of equitable jurisdiction.
Some such ground will have been established if the dissenting stockholder can
prove that the merger or consolidation was illegally brought about, or that
the transaction was fraudulent and subjected him to unfair treatment.5 8
As a general rule, lack of statutory authority to merge or consolidate, is a
ground of illegality which is sufficient under any circumstances to enable a
dissenting stockholder to obtain an injunctionP Likewise, ample grounds to
invoke equitable interference seem to be present where the procedure as out-
lined in the merger or consolidation statute has not been complied with, such
as the failure to obtain the consent of the requisite number of stockholders,60
or where the transaction violates some state or federal statute, such as by a
provision in the agreement authorizing an issue of stock in excess of the true
value of the assets of the surviving or consolidated corporation.0 1 Another
objection on the grounds of illegality, somewhat limited by the difficulties of
proof, would seem to be the fact that, although the forms of the statute have
been complied with, there has been no substantial compliance with the pur-
poses of the statute or with the procedure outlined therein. While these
grounds of objection are important, today they constitute the exceptional
grounds for invoking equitable interference. The bulk of the cases where
57. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Rr. Co., 250 Fed. 160 (C. C. A. 6th,
1918); cf. Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp., 6 F. Supp. 313 (D. N. J. 1934).
58. MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396 (Ch.
1928); Rankin v. Interstate Equities Corp., 180 Aft. 541 (Del. Ch. 1935); Raff v. Darrow,
184 Ind. 353, 111 N. E. 189 (1916); Morse v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 124 App.
Div. 235, 108 N. Y. Supp. 986 (1st Dep't 1908); cf. Gamble v. Queens County Water Co.,
123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201 (1890). But cf. Terhune v. Midland Rr. Co., 38 N. J. Eq.
423 (Ch. 1884) semble.
59. Riker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 580, 82 AUt. 930 (Ct. Errors and
App. 1912); Knapp v. Supreme Commandery, United Order of the Golden Cross of the World,
121 Tenn. 212, 118 S. W. 390 (1908).
60. Cf. Agoodash Achim of Ithaca v. Temple Beth-El, 147 Misc. 405, 263 N, Y. Supp,
81 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Tuttle v. Michigan Air Line Rr. Co., 35 Mich. 247 (1877).
61. Taylor v. Citizens' Oil Co., 182 Ky. 350, 206 S. IV. 644 (1918). The line of cases
holding that the state alone can question the validity of a merger or consolidation on
grounds of such illegality are usually situations where it is alleged that the combination will
violate a statutory or constitutional prohibition against the merger or consolidation of com-
peting or parallel roads. Cf. Warrener v. Kankakee County, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,205, at 293
(C. C. N. D. Ill. 1875); Chicago & Western Ind. Rr. Co. v. Heidenreich, 254 Ill. 231, 98
N. E. 567 (1912); Bell v. Pennsylvania, S. & N. E. Rr., 10 At. 741 (N. J. Ch. 1887). But
cf. Pearsall v. Great Northern Rr. Co., 161 U. S. 646 (1896).
62. CL Small v. Sullivan, 245 N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261 (1927), in which directors of a
corporation were held liable where they had used the consolidation device solely as a means
to create a surplus from which to declare dividends; Compton v. Wabash, St. Louis &
Pacific Ry. Co., 45 Ohio St. 592, 619, 16 N. E. 110, 119 (1888), where the court said that
"the object of the legislature in authorizing the consolidation of railway companies was
. .not to enable the new company to obtain credit by impairing the security of existing
creditors . . . but to enable existing companies to unite, and form a continuous line." See
Goodbar, The Youngstown Litigation (1931) 11 B. U. L. Rzv. 376. But cf. Wick v.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 46 Ohio App. 253, 188 N. E. 514 (1932), error disminsed,
127 Ohio St. 379, 189 N. E. 4 (1933).
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injunctions are sought are based on allegations of fraud on the part of the
majority stockholders and promoters of the transaction, and of unfairness
to the dissenting stockholder in the plan for the exchange of shares.
Fraud and- unfairness are normally found together, and where they result
in a substantial detriment6 3 to the dissenting stockholder, equity will generally
grant injunctive relief. Considered apart from the facts of a given case,
generalizations as to fraud and unfairness are of little utility. However, gen-
eralizations may be made to the extent that the facts that the constituent
corporations have common directors, or that the majority stockholders in each
constituent are the same, are in themselves insufficient to establish any fraud
or unfairness in the transaction.64 While such facts may induce a court of
equity to scrutinize the transaction more closely, the burden remains on the
dissenting stockholder to prove other facts pointing to fraud and unfairness.P
But while generalizations as to fraud and unfairness are difficult, there are
three frequently recurring factual situations, which, with slight variations,
appear to embrace virtually every case in which fraud and unfairness have
been alleged. The first of these situations is where by the terms of the plan
for the exchange of shares, the stockholders of one or more of the constituents
are given preferential treatment over the stockholders of the constituent in
which the complainant owns stock. As a result, the complainant is receiving
stock which represents a proportional interest in the surviving or consolidated
corporation less than that which his shares in his constituent represented.
Thus, his interest is being diluted both in respect to the value of his shares
and to the amount of his control over the corporate affairs. When this is the
substance of a complainant's allegation, the court of equity must necessarily
investigate the financial structures of the constituent corporations in order
to compare the value of the contribution of one constituent with that of the
others. In making such valuations courts of equity usually seize upon the
two elements of net assets and earning p6wer. If upon being tested by these
two elements, it appears to the court that there has been a substantial diminu-
tion of the dissenting stockholder's interest, adequate basis for the issuance
of an injunction ought to exist even in the absence of a showing of any fraudu-
lent purpose on the part of the majority stockholders.60 Often, however, an
63. The term "substantial" clearly seems to beg the question. But since it is solely a
question of degree, apart from a given set of circumstances, it is impossble to tell what
will be regarded as a substantial detriment.
64. Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 AtL 425 (1928); Bingham v.
Savings Investment & Trust Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 413, 138 At. 659 (Ch. 1927) ; Armstrong v.
Hayden, 126 Misc. 786, 214 N. Y. Supp. 747 (Sup. CL 1926); see Voight v. Remich, 2C0
Mich. 198, 244 N. W. 446, 450 (1932).
65. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 At. 486 (Ch.
1923) ; Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 Ad. 425 (1928).
66. Colby v. Equitable Title & Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. Supp. 978 (lst
Dep't 1908); Langan v. Francklyn, 20 N. Y. Supp. 404 (N. Y. City Cts. 1892); cf. AlUed
Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 At. 486 (Ch. 1923); Prid-
more v. Whiting Corp., 268 111. App. 592 (1932); Cooper v. Central Alloy Stel Corp., 43
Ohio App. 455, 183 N. E. 439 (1931). In respect to unfairness standing alone, the courts
will often say, as did the court in Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., at 19, 494,
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apparent unfairness because of a considerable disparity in the net asset con-
tributions of constituents will be balanced by an inverse disparity in their
respective earning powers.67 Likewise, what on the surface may appear to
be grossly unfair plans of exchange may be explained by the presence of over-
valued assets, insufficient reserves for depreciation, or failure to make adequate
allowance for bad debts. 68 The possibility of objections on the basis of this
type of unfairness can be lessened greatly by taking the precaution of having
an accurate appraisal and audit at the time the agreement of merger or con-
solidation is drawn up.
The second factual situation in which a court of equity may find fraud and
unfairness in a merger or consolidation is where, as a result of the plan of
exchange of shares, one class of stockholders within a constituent corporation
is given preferential treatment over the class of which the complainant is a
member. 'His complaint is not that all the stockholders of his constituent
are being treated unfairly, but only that the stockholders of his class are
being discriminated against, so that after the transaction his shares will not
represent the same proportional interest as they did formerly, neither in
respect to value nor to control.69 This situation normally arises where the
common stockholders, by virtue of statute, are the only group entitled to
approve or reject the agreement of merger or consolidation, and by this means
have made the distribution of shares more beneficial to themselves than to the
preferred or some other class of stockholders. If the court is satisfied that
the dilution of the complainant's interest is substantial, adequate grounds for
the issuance of an injunction exist, especially since some element of fraud
is invariably present.70
Somewhat distinct from the two foregoing situations is the third where
the agreement of merger or consolidation calls for the surrender or diminution
of some special right. Examples of this type of unfairness may differ widely,
but usually arise in connection with preferred stock. Thus, where a stock-
holder has a high-grade security such as stock in a corporation, the properties
that "when the price ... is so far below what is found to be a fair one that it can be ex-
plained only on the theory of fraud, or a reckless indifference to the rights of others in-
terested, it would seem that it should not be allowed to stand." See also Matter of Ameri-
can Telegraph & Cable Co., 139 Misc. 625, 248 N. Y. Supp. 98 (Sup. Ct. 1931). But see
Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 83, 141 At]. 425, 433 (1928).
67. Colby v. Equitable Title & Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. Supp. 978 (1st
Dep't, 1908).
68. Cole v. Nat. Cash, Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 AtI. 183 (Ch. 1931).
69. In this connection, assuming the complainant is a preferred stockholder and that the
actual value of his preferred stock is less than the liquidation value provided for in the pre-
ferred stock contract, it would seem that the complainant is not entitled to have stockl
of the surviving or consolidated corporation issued to him in proportion to that liquidation
value, but only in proportion to the actual value. This result is consistent with the badc
theory of merger and consolidation that such a transaction is not a dissolution of the
enterprise, but a method of continuing the enterprise in a larger entity.
70. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Eagleson
v. Pacific Timber Co., 270 Fed. 1008 (D. Del. 1920); MacFarlane v. North American
Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396 (Ch. 1928); cf. Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell,
113 Ala. 177, 20 So. 981 (1896).
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of which are under long term leases to another corporation, a plan of merger
or consolidation calling for the exchange of this stock for ordinary stock of
the surviving or consolidated corporation may be sufficiently detrimental to
the dissenting stockholder to warrant issuance of an injunction.7 ' Similarly,
equity may find adequate grounds to enjoin where the preferred stock to be
issued in the exchange is callable within a shorter time than the old preferred
stock; where the new preferred stock is callable at the option of the surviv-
ing or consolidated corporation; where the preferred stockholders were about
to acquire voting rights because of a default in preferred dividends, and the
merger or consolidation will prevent this from occurring; or where arrears of
dividends exist which the merger or consolidation will wipe out 72 However,
in cases where there is no prospect that the constituent will ever pay off
arrears in preferred dividends, the propriety of enjoining the merger or con-
solidation on the latter ground may well be questioned. 73 Although fraud as
well as unfairness is usually present in this third situation, the latter alone
should be sufficient if the complainant proves a substantial injury to his
interest.
The judicial decisions on all three of these factual situations are not clear
as to whether, in the absence of any fraud, substantial unfairness alone is a
sufficient basis for equitable intervention. To protect adequately the interests
of minority stockholders, such unfairness alone should be sufficient. Indeed,
it would seem very reasonable as a means of assuring fair treatment to all
stockholders to insert in the merger and consolidation statutes a requirement
that before articles of merger or consolidation may be filed with the secretary
of state, the fairness of the transaction be confirmed by some judicial or
administrative body.7 4 In corporate reorganizations the fairness of the re-
organization plan is judicially determined, and like considerations exist to
71. Boyd v. N. Y. & H. Rr. Co., 220 Fed. 174 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); Outwater v. Public
Service Corp. of N. J., 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 At. 729 (Ch. 1928), afPd, without opinion,
104 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 At]. 916 (Ct. Errors and App. 1929); cf. Simon Borg & Co. v. New
Orleans City Rr. Co., 244 Fed. 617 (E. D. La. 1917).
72. Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 At. 657 (Ch. 1907); Outwater v.
Public Service Corp. of N. J., 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 AtL 729 (Ch. 1928), affd without
opinion, 104 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 At]. 916 (Ct. Errors and App. 1929); see Cole v. Nat. Cash
Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 56, 156 At!. 183, 187 (Ch. 1931); cf. Windhurt v. Central
Leather Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 543, 138 Atl. 772 (Ch. 1927); Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. Inter-
national Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 554, 139 At!. 50 (Ch. 1927). For the factual
background of Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., see DEvwwo, Co.r-oa Pzoaorzo.s mmD RE-
OiRGANZATIONS (1914) c. 2.
73. Thus, as a result of merger or consolidation the surviving or consolidated corporation
may be able to pay dividends on its preferred stock, while to force the constituent corpora-
tion to continue without the financial aid to be received from the other constituents may
lead to bankruptcy. See Bisbee, supra note 15, at 379.
74. In practical effect some such requirement may e.'ist in some states in respect to
certain classes of corporations such as public utilities and banks. Thus, in American Malt
Corp. v. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs, 86 N. 3. L. 663, 92 At]. 362 (Ct. Errors and
App. 1914), it was held that the Board of Public Utility CommL-iioners could withhold
their approval to a merger on the ground that it was unfair to the preferred stockholders.
See also Onio Gms. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) §§ 710-S6. Where the corporations participat-
ing in the transaction are of different states, such a requirement might create certain juris-
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justify a similar procedure in connection with mergers and consolidationsY
Thus, minority stockholders would be protected, and once the fairness of the
transaction had been confirmed, the merger or consolidation could proceed
free from any attack. Should this be regarded as too drastic an extension of
the reorganization procedure, at least the right should be granted to any
stockholder to have the fairness of the plan judicially determined, irrespective
of any element of fraud on the part of the management or majority stock-
holders.
76
As mentioned previously, should a stockholder desire neither to become a
stockholder in the surviving or consolidated corporation, nor to prevent the
merger or consolidation from taking place, there are invariably one and occa-
sionally two methods by which he may obtain the value of his shares in his
constituent corporation from the surviving or consolidated corporation. The
normal procedure is to have his shares appraised under the appraisal statutes
which form a part of practically every merger or consolidation statute. 7 In
a few states these appraisal statutes originated almost as early as the first
special acts authorizing merger or consolidation, and their history and pro-
cedure form a complete topic of discussion in themselves." Suffice it to men-
tion here that this form of relief can be invoked only by a strict compliance
with the procedure outlined in the appraisal statute of the particular jurisdic-
tion of which the constituent was a corporation."0
dictional problems, especially in the case of a consolidation. To make the requirement
workable in this respect, it would first seem highly desirable for all statutes to require that
the consolidated corporation become a corporation of a state of one of the constituents,
thus eliminating the difficulties created by the "interstate corporations." Then the judicial
or administrative body of the state of the consolidated corporation would be the only
tribunal to pass on the fairness of the plan, and its decision would be binding In all
states. Secondly, the statute should make the requirement applicable only where the
statutes of the states of the other constituents contain similar requirements. If such
reciprocal provisions were not present, there would always be the possibility that a plan
approved as fair by the judicial or administrative body of one state, might be found to be
unfair in a dissenting stockholder's suit in a state where there was no requirement of
having the fairness passed upon as a condition precedent.
75. Cf. Eagleson v. Pacific Timber Co., 270 Fed. 1008 (D. Del. 1920).
76. That possibly a stockholder would have such a right by statute in Michigan, see
Mxcn. Comp. LAws (Mason, Supp. 1933) § 10135-4 (3).
77. N. J. Coiw. STAT. (Supp. 1924) tit. 47, § 108a; MICH. Comp. LAWS (Mason, Supp.
1933) § 10135-54.
78. Complete discussions of the appraisal statutes and their procedure are to be found
in Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 HAmv. L.
Rv. 233; Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation
of Their Shares (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 60; Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders
(1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 547; see Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern
Corporation Law (1931) 19 Caur. L. Rav. 465, 482; Comment (1932) 41 YAL. L. J. 577.
79. Typical requirements are that, first the dissenting stockholder must have voted
against the merger or consolidation, or if not entitled to vote, he must have objected in
writing prior to the taking of the vote. Secondly, within twenty days after the agreement
of merger or consolidation has been filed with the secretary of state, he must make a
written demand on the surviving or consolidated corporation for payment of his stock.
If the latter does not make payment, within thirty days after the making of his demand
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A second means still available in some states to the dissenting stockholder
is by a direct action at law for the conversion of his shares,8 or more usually
in equity, upon the basis that the complainant's property is being taken from
him against his consent.sl Originally this form of relief was granted because
a stockholder of a constituent could not be compelled to become a stockholder
in the surviving or consolidated corporation, and, in the absence of an ap-
praisal statute, some means of compensating him for his shares was neces-
sary.82 At the present time, where the proportion of stockholder approval
required by the statute has been obtained, the decisions are not agreed as to
whether this form of relief exists concurrently with that of the appraisal
statutes. In some states the appraisal statutes, while not a bar to injunctive
relief,ss are regarded as the exclusive remedy in a suit for the value of stock;
8 4
in others a suit in equity for the "actual" value of the stock remains avail-
able.85 This latter relief may prove very valuable where the dissenting
stockholder cannot invoke the aid of the appraisal statute by reason of his
failure to comply with its conditions precedent. If in a given jurisdiction
a dissenting stockholder would be assured a judicial review of the fairness of
the plan of merger or consolidation, either by virtue of case law or by some
statutory provision,s6 it would seem desirable as a matter of policy to make
the appraisal remedy exclusive in any action for the value of stock. The sur-
viving or consolidated corporation is entitled to know the extent of dissenting
stockholders' claims which it must meet within a reasonable time after the
merger or consolidation has been effected, and moreover, the appraisal pro-
for payment, the dissenting stockholder must petition the county court of the county in
which the principal office of the surviving or consolidated is located to appoint three ap-
praisers to appraise the value of his stock. The award of the appraisers, if not opposed
within ten days after it has been filed in court, becomes final and conclusive. If opposed,
the award will be reviewed by the court, in the same manner as it reviews awards made
pursuant to eminent domain proceedings. N. C. CODE A.;N. (Michie, 1931) § 1224(c). The
requirements of appraisal statutes are discussed in Stephenson v. Commonwealth &
Southern Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 91, 156 At. 215 (Ch. 1931). The surviving or con-
solidated corporation is the true defendant, but the inclusion of a constituent as a
defendant is usually not fatal. Southern Power Co. v. Cella, 143 Ad. 755 (N. J. Sup. Ct.
1923); Budd v. Logan Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 112 Pa. Super. 65, 170 At]. 325 (1934). The
expenses of the appraisal proceedings are imposed ordinarily upon the surviving or con-
solidated corporation. Cf. Manning v. Brandon Corp., 161 S. E. 405 (S. C. 1931).
So. Nice Ball Bearing Co. v. Mortgage Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 Pa. 560, 166 Ad. 239
(1933).
81. Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 At. 912 (1907).
82. Lauman v. Lebanon Valley Rr. Co., 30 Pa. 42 (1858).
83. But see CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 369.
84. In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., 277 Fed. 455 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Spencer
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 137 N. C. 107, 49 S. E. 96 (1904).
85. The remedy of the appraisal statute is regarded as a remedy additional to, but not
supplanting, the equitable remedy. Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 21S Pa. 649, 67
At. 912 (1907); cf. Nice Ball Bearing Co. v. Mortgage Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 Pa. 560,
166 At. 239 (1933).
86. In New Jersey, at least, it seems that a dissenting stockholder is usually able to have
the fairness of the plan reviewed, even in the absence of any element of fraud.
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cedure seems to afford the dissenting stockholder a more summary and satis-
factory method of relief than that of an equitable action, which in some states
at least, might involve a considerable length of time. However, since at the
present time the dissenting stockholder's right to a judicial review of the
fairness of the plan is so uncertain, it seems better not to make the appraisal
remedy exclusive, and thereby deprive him of what protection the equitable
action may afford.
One unusual proceeding for the value of stock is an action by a preferred
stockholder for the specific performance of his preferred stock contract which
usually entitles him to the par value of his shares upon the dissolution of the
corporation. Where the proportional interest represented by the preferred
shares is less in value than their par value, in at least one state it has been
held that the merger or consolidation amounted to a dissolution of the con-
stituent corporation, and that consequently the dissenting stockholder was
entitled to receive the par value of his preferred stock.87 However, elsewhere
this result has been expressly denied.88 The correct solution would seem
to depend on whether the legislature in stating that the constituent corpora-
tions are dissolved upon merger or consolidation, except for the surviving
corporation in the case of merger, intended "dissolved" to mean a cessation
of their corporate existences, to which the preferred stock contract has refer-
ence, or to mean merely a technical dissolution within the purview of the dis-
solution statute.89
The Rights and Remedies of Creditors. It is universally agreed that upon
merger or consolidation, the surviving or consolidated corporation is always
liable for the debts, liabilities, and duties of each of its constituents. Gen-
erally the basis of this liability is an express statutory imposition, 0 and express
assumption thereof in the agreement of merger or consolidation, 91 or both.0 2
87. Petry v. Harwood Elec. Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 Atl. 302 (1924).
88. Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 543, 138 At. 772 (Ch. 1927).
89. See Simms, An Application of the Doctrine that Consolidation Effects Dissolution
(1929) 15 VA. L. Rxv. 757; Comment (1932) 45 H.Av. L. Rxv. 1401; Comment (1932) 30
MicH. L. REv. 1074.
90. E. g. CAL. Civ. CO E (Deering, 1931) § 361 (7); DEi.. REv. Conr (1915) § 1974,
as amended by Act of April 18, 1935; IL. STAT. Axx. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, § 157.69
(e); N. Y. STocK CoRp. LAw (1923) §§ 85 (2), 90; PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 1934) tit. 15,
§ 2852-907. For an early statute imposing such liability, see Md. Laws 1838, c. 30, § 4,
See Greene v. Woodland Ave. & W. S. St. Rr. Co., 62 Ohio St. 67, 79, 56 N. E. 642, 646
(1900); Camden Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Burlington Carpet Co., 33 Ati. 479, 480 (N.
J. Ch. 1895). Under the New York merger statute, prior to 1923, the surviving (posse,-sor)
corporation was not liable for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the corporations
merged into it. The existences of the latter were preserved for the purposes of suit. Irvine
v. N. Y. Edison Co., 207 N. Y. 425, 101 N. E. 358 (1913); Syracuse Lighting Co. v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 226 N. Y. 25, 122 N. E. 723 (1919); see Ducasse v. American Yellow
Taxi Operators, Inc., 224 App. Div. 516, 518, 231 N. Y. Supp. 51, 54 (2d Dep't, 1928).
91. State v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 213 Iowa 200, 238 N. W. 726 (1931);
American Bank v. Port Orford Cedar Products Co., 140 Ore. 138, 12 P. (2d) 1014 (1932);
cf. Fears v. State Bank of Naylor, 224 Mo. App. 632, 31 S. W. (2d) 94 (1930). See also
15 FLErcEmR, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 7109-7116.
92. It is not unusual for the surviving or consolidated corporation to assume the debts,
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In the absence of such bases of liability, the surviving or consolidated cor-
poration is nevertheless liable, either fully as if it had incurred the liability
in question itself,93 or partially to the extent of the assets received from the
constituent,94 upon either the theory of an implied assumption of liability by
the surviving or consolidated corporation, or upon that of a fraudulent con-
veyance.95 Where, however, the constituent was under a duty to perform
a positive act, such as use a product exclusively in its business, the surviving
or consolidated corporation will be subject to that duty only to the extent that
the constituent was subject to it at the time of the merger or consolidation;
that duty will not extend to the entire business of the surviving or consolidated
corporation. 6 Where bonds or other obligations have been issued by a con-
stituent with a privilege in the holder of converting them into stock at his
option, it usually is held that the conversion privilege is extinguished by the
liabilities, and obligations of its constituents, even though a statute also exprEsly imposes
such liability.
93. Atlantic & B. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 127 Ga. 392, 56 S. E. 482 (1907); see Morrison
v. American Snuff Co., 89 Am. St. Rep. 604, 637 (1903). However, there has been no actual
case where the liability of the surviving or consolidated corporation has been held to be
greater than the value of the assets received. See McKee v. Standard Minerals Corp., 18
Del. Ch. 97, 101, 156 AtL 193, 195 (1931). But see statement by the same chancellor in
Cole v. Nat. Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 52, 156 Ati. 183, 185 (1931), a case decided in
the same month as the preceding case.
94. United States Capsule Co. v. Isaacs, 23 Ind. App. 533, 55 N. E. 832 (1899); Berry
v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & AT. Rr. Co., 52 Kan. 774, 36 Pac. 724 (1894); Morrison v. Ameri-
can Snuff Co., 79 Bliss. 330, 30 So. 723 (1901), and note thereto in 89 Am. St. Rep. 604, 638
(1903).
95. These theories are discussed in GLn , CaRmros' Rx(ans AD Rssmxzs (1915)
§ 126. Typical cases utilizing the theory of an implied assumption include Cox v. Balti-
more & 0. S. W. Rr. Co., 180 Ind. 495, 103 N. E. 337 (1913); Berry v. Kansas City, F. S.
& M. Rr. Co., 52 Kan. 774, 36 Pac. 724 (1894); see Gueringer v. St. Louis, B. and A. Ry.
Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 704, 706 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1930); cf. Morlock v. Mt. Forest Farms
of America, 269 Alich. 549, 257 N. W. 880 (1934). Cases proceeding on the theory of
fraudulent conveyance are Jackson v. Knights and Ladies of the Orient, 101 Kan. 393, 466,
167 Pac. 1046 (1917); Morrison v. American Snuff Co., 79 Miss. 330, 30 So. 723 (1901);
cf. Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 5 W. W. Harr. 339, 16S At. 87 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1933), noted in
(1933) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 172. The question of whether these theories are tenable is
rendered academic by the virtually universal imposition of liability on the surviving or
consolidated corporation by statute. However, a similar problem arises frequently today in
a combination by a sale of entire corporate assets. While here, too, the purchasing corpora-
tion often assumes the seller's liabilities, in the absence of such assumption the creditor
must proceed on one or the other of the two theories above. See Erhard v. Boone State
Bank, 65 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933); West Texas Refining & Dev. Co. v. Comm'r of
Int. Rev., 68 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); Mallory S. S. Co. v. Baker & Holmes Co.,
117 Fla. 196, 157 So. 504 (1934); Harlan Public Service Co. v. Eastern Construction Co.,
254 Ky. 135, 71 S. W. (2d) 24 (1934); Comment (1930) 44 HA. L. RLn. 260; (1927)
I1 Mnx. L. Rv. 372.
96. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pac. Rr. Co., 115 U. S. 587 (1885); Ducasze
v. American Yellow Taxi Operators, Inc., 224 App. Div. 516, 231 N. Y. Supp. 51 (2d Dep't
1928).
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merger or consolidation, unless some provision therefor is made in the agree-
ment.9
7
Since creditors are fully protected upon merger or consolidation, injunctive
relief will be denied to them except under very unusual circumstances0 8
Hence, the principal problem of the creditor is that of proceeding to enforce
his claim. This procedure varies in accordance with the statutes of the vari-
ous states and with the practice within those states. If the creditor com-
menced his suit prior to the date on which the merger or consolidation became
effective, his action is usually saved by express statutory provision, even
though the existence of the constituent has not been preserved for the purpose
of creditors' suits in general.99 The normal procedure 'in such a case Is to
substitute the surviving or consolidated corporation as defendant in the place
of the constituent.100 If the creditor had not commenced his suit prior to the
time the merger or consolidation became effective, he may have a choice of
several methods of proceeding. Where the statutes expressly impose liability
or where there has been an express assumption, the creditor may proceed at
97. Tagart and Bennett v. Northern Central Ry. Co., 29 Md. 557 (1868); Parkinson v.
West End St. Ry. Co., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N. E. 891 (1899). However, the holders of such
convertible bonds have been held to be entitled to notice of the transaction so as to be
given an opportunity to convert. Rosenkrans v. Lafayette, B. & M. Ry. Co,, 18 Fed. 513
(C. C. D. Ind. 1883). See Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Draftmanship
(1930) 19 CA=T. L. Rxv. 1, 33-38, in which three Massachusetts cases pointing to a con-
trary result are distinguished. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Worcester, Nashua &
Rochester Rr. Co., 149 Mass. 214, 21 N. E. 364 (1889); Day v. Worcester, N. & R. Rr.
Co., 151 Mass. 302, 23 N. E. 824 (1890); India Mutual Ins. Co. v. Worcester, N. & R. Rr.
Co., 25 N. E. 975 (Mass. 1890). See also 1 QuImRY, BoNDs AND BoiNr ouDms (1934) 9
11. For a suggestion that the general rule should be different today in at least certain cases,
consult Berle, Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 649,
662. For the situation where the conversion contract has provided for merger or con-
solidation, see supra note 35.
98. Where the security of the creditors of the constituent would be endangered by the
merger or consolidation, it would seem that the creditors could enjoin the transaction. Cf.
Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139 (1865). However, in Cole v. Nat. Cash Credit Ass'n, 18
Del. Ch. 47, 156 At]. 183, 186 (1931), the court stated that even if the surviving corpora-
tion was a less desirable debtor than the constituent because of a poorer quick asset condi-
tion, the merger would not be enjoined. Nor would the fact that the debtor constituent was
subject to service of process as a foreign corporation doing business within a state, and
that the surviving corporation would not be, afford an adequate basis for an injunction. Sco
(1932) 32 Cor. L. Rav. 143.
99. E. g. ILr. REv. STAT. Am. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, § 157.69 (e)i N. Y. STocK
CORP. LAw (1923) § 90; OHmo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 8623-69. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Astoria Mahogany Co., 299 Fed. 579 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924);
Wells v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 108 Mo. App. 607, 84 S. W. 204 (1904); Baltimore
& Susquehanna Rr. Co. v. Musselman, 2 Grant's Cas. 348 (Pa. 1856).
100. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hickson, 197 M11. 117, 64 N. E. 248 (1902); Wright v.
Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis Rr. Co., 141 Mo. App. 518, 126 S. W. 517 (1910). But
cf. Prouty v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Rr. Co., 52 N. Y. 363 (1873). At the pre-
ent time this right to substitute is expressly provided for in some general merger and con-
solidation statutes. E. g. IND. STAT. AxN. (Burns, Watson's Supp. 1929) § 4856 (e); N. Y.
STOCK CORP. LAW (1923) § 90.
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law directly against the surviving or consolidated corporation for judgment
and execution.' 0 ' The fact that the surviving or consolidated corporation
may be a corporation of a state other than that of the constituent which
incurred the creditor's claim ordinarily will not create any difficulties, since it
is not uncommon for statutes expressly to provide that the surviving or con-
solidated corporation must agree to submit to process in the state in which
the constituent had been a corporation, and the most recent statutes provide
that the secretary of state shall be irrevocably appointed agent to accept such
service.' 0 2 Often the same statute which expressly imposes such liability
will also preserve the existences of the constituent corporations for the very
purpose of creditors' suits.'03 If the statute does not so preserve the con-
stituents, the creditor's sole remedy is against the surviving or consolidated
corporation.' 0
Where process may be served upon the surviving or consolidated corporation
after the merger or consolidation, there seems to be no reason for preserving
the existences of the constituents either from the point of view of unsecured or
secured creditors, or on grounds of general policy.105 The position of the un-
secured creditor after merger or consolidation is the same whether the constit-
101. Birmingham lr. Light & Power Co. v. Enslen, 144 Ala. 343, 39 So. 74 (19DS);"
Mercer-Lincoln Pine Knob Oil Co. v. Payne, 206 Ky. 848, 268 S. W. 584 (1925); Board-
man v. Lake Shore & M. S. Rr. Co., 84 N. Y. 157 (1881); Langhorne v. Richmond Ry.
Co., 91 Va. 369, 22 S. E. 159 (1895). And even in the absence of either of these two, it
has been held that the surviving or consolidated corporation can be sued directly. Warren
v. Mobile & Montgomery Rr. Co., 49 Ala. 582 (1873); Indianapolis, C. & L. Rr. Co. v.
Jones, 29 Ind. 465 (1868); cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Citizen's Nat.
Bank, 13 F. (2d) 213 (D. N. M. 1924). Contra: Shaw v. Norfolk County Rr. Co., 82
Mass. 407 (1860). Consult also 15 FLErcHER, op. cit. mipra note 3, § 7171. Where
some purely equitable remedy such as specific performance is desired, the surviving or
consolidated corporation is to be held, of course, directly in equity. Union Pacific Rr.
Co. v. McAlpine, 129 U. S. 305 (1888).
102. E. g. DEL. Rxv. CoDE (1915) § 1973, as amended by Act of April 18, 1935; N. Y.
STOCK CoP. LAw (1934) § 91 (8). In the very early special acts authorizing merger or
consolidation of Massachusetts corporations with those of other states, the special act fre-
quently provided that the surviving or consolidated corporation have one officer in each
state upon whom process could be served against such corporation. E. g. Mass. Laws 1827,
c. 74, § 2; Mass. Acts & Resolves 1840, c. 50, § 2.
103. E. g. AL. CODE Ase . (Michie, 1928) § 7042; N. MT. STAT. A re. (Courtrigbt, 1929)
§ 32-216; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 3823. In such a case the creditor may choose to re-
gard the constituent as his debtor, reduce his claim to judgment, and proceed to execution,
in some states by levying on the property of the constituent in the hands of the surviving
or consolidated corporation; in others, in equity by resort to a creditor's bill. Matter of
Utica Nat. Brewing Co., 154 N. Y. 263, 48 N. E. 521 (1897); Shaw v. Norfolk County Rr.
Co., 82 Mass. 407 (1860); cf. Chicago Santa Fe & California Rr. Co. v. As hling, 160 Ill.
373, 43 N. E. 373 (1895); Shipman Coal Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pfeiffer, 11 Ind. App. 445,
39 N. E. 291 (1895); Langhorne v. Richmond Ry. Co., 91 Va. 369, 22 S. E. 159 (1895).
See GLntx, FRAUDuLE=i CoNv=. cEs (1931), § 288.
104. Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 288 (1859); Peoria & R. L Rr. Co. v. Coal Valley
Mining Co., 68 Ill. 489 (1873); Dalmas v. Philipsburg & S. V. Rr. Co., 254 Pa. 9, 93 At].
796 (1916).
105. Comment (1932) 30 MlcH. L. REv. 1074, 1077.
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uents are preserved or not. The merger or consolidation creates no lien in favor
of such a creditor upon the property that a constituent contributed to the sur-
viving or consolidated corporation, and although the decisions refer to a
"virtual" lien being created in such a case, it has none of the legal consequences
of a true lien.10 6 Consequently, whether the constituents are preserved or not,
the unsecured creditor will be forced to resort for purposes of execution to the
general assets of the surviving or consolidated corporation. But in most cases
this will afford him a greater mass of assets upon which execution may be
levied than-was previously the case. Nor is there any advantage to the secured
creditor in the preservation of the constituent which created his lien. For
whether it is preserved or not, his lien on the property of the constituent con-
tinues to be a lien on that same property in the possession of the surviving or
consolidated corporation, and will be prior to any liens on such property created
by the latter corporation. 10 7 Finally, the preservation of the constituents' ex-
istences is totally inconsistent with the basic conception of merger or consolida-
tion that the constituents are extinguished to be re-created into a larger corpor-
ate whole.108
Probably the most difficult problem arising in connection with creditors is
the effect of merger.or consolidation upon clauses in corporate mortgages ex-
tending the lien of the mortgage to all after-acquired property. As a general
rule the effect of such a clause is nullified by the merger or consolidation if the
covenant to extend the lien was that of the constituent only. Consequently, in
such a case, the lien neither extends to property contributed by the other con-
stituents, nor to that subsequently acquired by the surviving or consolidated
corporation. 09 However, the trust indenture to the trustee for the mortgagees
may make express provision that the after-acquired clause shall continue to be
effective after merger or consolidation, in which case the lien would extend to
106. Wabash, St. Louis & P. Rr. Co. v. Iram, 114 U. S. 587 (1885); Hervey v. Illinois
Midland Ry. Co., 28 Fed. 169 (C. C. S. D. IIl. 1884); McMahan v. Morrison, 16 Ind. 172
(1861) ; Blake v. Domestic Mfg. Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 480, 38 Ati. 241 (Ch. 1897) ; cf. Bowden
v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 2 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924). But cf. Compton v.
Wabash, St. L. & P. PR3. Co., 45 Ohio St. 592, 16 N. E. 110 (1888).
107. Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. N. Y. Rys. Co., 292 Fed. 429 (S. D. N. Y.
1923), aff'd 292 Fed. 440 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Columbia & Montour Electric Co. v. North
Branch Transit Co., 258 Pa. 447, 102 Ati. 214 (1917). A state will retain its preferred
position as a creditor. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. American Surety Co. of N.
Y., 313 Pa. 145, 169 Aft. 226 (1933).
108. Moreover, once the merger or consolidation has become effective, in seeking to
hold the constituent the creditor may frequently be confronted with the practical dlf.
ficulty of finding the proper persons upon whom to serve process. Cf. Thomson v, Me-
Morran Milling Co., 132 Mich. 591, 94 N. V. 188 (1903).
109. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Chicago & E. L. Rr. Co., 253 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 7thb,
1918); Susquehanna Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. United Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 F. (2d) 179 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1925); Railway Steel Springs Co. v. Chicago and E. I. Rr. Co., 246 Fed. 338
(N. D. Ill. 1912). This entire subject is discussed by Justice Cardozo with a complete
citation of cases in Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. N. Y. & Queens County Ry. Co., 253
N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887 (1930). See also Foley and Pogue, After-Acquired Property under
Conflicting Corporate Indentures (1929) 13 Mm,. L. REv. 81.
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property subsequently acquired by the surviving or consolidated corporation 0
Special Legal Problems and Incidents of Merger and Consolidation. Although
the consolidation of two or more domestic corporations is always deemed to
create an entirely new corporate entity, whether or not this same result ensues
upon the consolidation of corporations of different states has been much dis-
puted in the decisions. Under the most modern type of consolidation statute, it
is clear not only that a new corporation is created but also that such new
corporation is a corporation of some one state.' 1' However, under the ordinary
type of statute dealing with the consolidation of corporations of different states,
since the consolidated corporation is not formed under the laws of any one state,
it is a somewhat anomalous type of corporate entity, often described as an
"interstate" corporation" 2 The weight of authority supports the view that
the consolidated "interstate" corporation so created is a new corporation, and
that the corporate existences of the constituents are terminated.P 3 An analysis
of the holdings supporting the contrary view leads to the conclusion that in
many instances the courts have been misled by jurisdictional questions or by
an undue solicitude for creditors, and as a result have made their language
broader than was actually necessary.
114
Regardless of whether consolidation of corporations of different states creates
a new corporation, within the borders of any state in which one of its con-
stituents had been a corporation, the consolidated corporation is subject to the
control of the state legislature and to the jurisdiction of the state courts 1' A
110. Cf. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Southern Trust Co., 261 Fed. 765, 767
(C. C. A. 8th, 1919) ; Foley and Pogue, supra note 109, at 91.
111. This would seem to be the result under the statutes of Arkansas, California, Dela-
ware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wash-
ington. The Uniform Business Corporations Law brings about this result, and several of
the above states have adopted its provisions, while others have been influenced by it. See
Uzrmo=a Businmss Coap. Acr § 43.
112. Bisbee, supra note 15, at 389, 390; 15 FLn~cHER, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 7181-7187;
Beale, CorPorations of Two States (1904) 4 Co. L. REv. 391.
113. Shields v. dhio, 95 U. S. 319 (1877); Keokuk & Western Rr. Co. v. Missouri, 152
U. S. 301 (1894); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lancaster, 149 Ga. 434, 100 S. E. 380 (1919);
Smith v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 170 Ind. 382, 81 N. E. 501 (1907); Rio
Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Telluride Power-Transmission Co., 16 Utah 125, 51 Pac. 146
(1897); Vermont Valley Rr. v. Conn. River Power Co., 99 Vt. 397, 133 At. 367 (1926).
114. See Ohio & Miss. Rr. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286 (U. S. 1861); Nashua & L.
Rr. Corp. v. Boston & L. Rr. Corp., 136 U. S. 356 (1890); Racine & Miss. Rr. Co. v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 49 Ill. 331 (1868), overruled in Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v.
People, 123 Ill. 467, 14 N. E. 874 (1888); New York Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes
and Assessments, 159 AtL. 810 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1932); Note 89 Am. St. Rep. 604, 649
(1903). The statement is often made that whether a new corporation results from con-
solidation depends on the statute in question. While in most cases this begs the isiue,
in a few of the early consolidations in particular, possibly the statute did not contemplate
a new corporation. See Farnum v. Blackstone Canal Corp., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,675, at
1059 (C. C. D. R. L 1830).
115. Peik v. Chicago & N. W. Rr. Co., 94 U. S. 164 (1876); People v. Dunldth &
Dubuque Bridge Co., 322 El. 99, 152 N. E. 526 (1926); Pollitz v. Public Utilities Comm.
of Ohio, 96 Ohio St. 49, 117 N. E. 149 (1917); Vermont Valley Rr. v. Conn. River
Power Co., 99 Vt. 397, 133 AUt. 367 (1926).
1935]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
like result occurs in regard to the surviving corporation in case of merger.110
Intricate problems of jurisdiction of the federal courts on the basis of di-
versity of citizenship have arisen where the consolidated interstate corporation
is a party plaintiff or defendant. When the consolidated corporation is sued,
if one of the constituent corporations had been a corporation of the state ini
which the federal court is located, the consolidated corporation will be presumed
to be a corporation of that state, and that state alone. It cannot be sued as
a citizen of two states or of some other state. Thus, if constituents of a certain
consolidated corporation had been corporations of Delaware and New York
respectively, a citizen of New York may sue the consolidated corporation in
the federal district court for Delaware, where it will be presumed to be a citizen
of Delaware. But he could not sue it in the federal court for New York by
claiming it was a citizen of Delaware."1 This rule may be justified if at all,
only on the ground that it affords a convenient method for ascertaining citizen-
ship for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. But the rule apparently in force
where the consolidated corporation is a plaintiff lacks even this virtue. It
has been held that a consolidated corporation, the constituents of which were
corporations of different states, may disregard any corporate existence which
it may possess as a corporation of the state in which it brings suit, and sue as a
citizen of another state in which one of its constituents had been incorporated.
Thus, the consolidated Delaware-New York corporation could sue a citizen of
New York in the federal courts in New York by suing as a Delaware corpora-
tion, and could sue a citizen of Delaware in the federal court in Delaware by
suing as a New York corporation.118 Aside from the long tradition of federal
116. However, the two cases differ in that upon consolidation the consolidated cor-
poration will be subject to control as a domestic corporation in each state, while upon
merger or consolidation under the most recent statutes, the surviving or consolidated
corporation will be subject to control as a domestic corporation in only one state,
Where a constituent corporation is a foreign corporation with a certificate enabling It to
do business in a state, some statutes provide that upon merger or consolidation the sur-
viving or consolidated corporation will not be required to take out a new certificate
unless the name of the corporation is changed or the corporation acquires the right
to engage in new lines of business. E.g. ILL. REv. STA. ANx. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) C. 32,
§ 157.113.
117. Railway Co. v. Whitton's Administrator, 13 Wall, 270 (U. S. 1871); Patch v.
Wabash Rr. Co., 207 U. S. 277 (1907); Fitzgerald v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 45 Fed, 812
(C. C. D. Neb. 1891); Peterborough Rr. v. B. & M. Rr., 239 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 1st,
1917); Consolidated Coal Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 44 F. (2d) 595 (D. Md. 1930);
cf. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545 (1896); Louisville, N. A. & C.
Ry. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552 (1899). See DomE, FEDAL J URISDIcTMOs
AND PROCEDURE (1928) 203; WHrLIAms, TREATisE ON FEaAL PRAcncn (1927) 167.
118. Nashua & L. Rr. Corp. v. Boston & L. Rr. Corp., 136 U. S. 356 (1890); cf. Caro-
lina & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Town of Clover, 34 F. (2d) 480 (W. D. S. C. 1929); WInuALom,
op. cit. supra note 117, at 169. The authority of the first of these two cases, which
established this rule, is perhaps open to question on the basis that the consolidated cor-
poration was one formed under special acts in 1838. In that period it was not nearly
so clear as in 1890 that, substantively, consolidation creates a new corporation. For the
rule that the consolidated corporation cannot sue as a corporation formed under the laws
of two states, see Ohio & Mississippi Rr. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286, 297 (U. S. 1861);
St. Joseph & G. I. Rr. Co. v. Steele, 167 U. S. 659, 663 (1897).
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courts to invoke presumptions and fictions when dealing with the citizenship
of corporations, there seems to be no reason for these rules. In view of the
fact that the validity of the diversity of citizenship basis of federal jurisdiction
has itself been questioned, and that the tendency is to relieve federal courts
from unnecessary litigation, it would seem better to take cognizance of the
fact that substantively the consolidated corporation may be regarded as a
corporation of both states.119 Of course, under the most modern statutes these
problems should not arise, because the consolidated corporation must become
a corporation of some one state. Likewise, these difficulties of federal jurisdic-
tion are obviated upon a merger, because the surviving corporation remains
solely a corporation of the state of its original creation. 2 0
Upon a consolidation, whether of domestic corporations or of corporations
of different states, since a new corporation is created, it becomes subject to
stock issuance and organization taxes, and to incorporation fees imposed upon
the privilege of incorporating.121 Where the organization tax is measured by
the amount of the capital stock of the consolidated corporation, it is liable to
be taxed on the entire amount of its capital stock, even though that capital
stock is merely the aggregate of those of the constituents, upon which the
organization tax had previously been paid. -' And even if the consolidated
corporation is an "interstate" corporation, each state may impose such an
organization tax upon the full amount of the capital stock, since each state is
granting to the consolidated corporation the privilege of incorporating.L' 3
119. See Wn.uaars, op. cit. supra note 117, at 168; Frankfurter and Landis, A Study
in thze Federal Judicidal System (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 834, 871; Comment (1931) 44
HARv. L. Rv. 1106, 1110.
120. Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co., 150 Fed. 775 (C. C. D. S. C. 1906); Royal
Palm Soap Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 296 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
121. The issuance of stock upon a merger or consolidation clearly falls within the
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Strr. 101, Schedule A-2, 26 U. S. C. A. § 931,
Schedule A-2, (1926), as amended by Revenue Act of 1932, 47 ST,%T. 272, Schedule A-2
(1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 901, Schedule A-2 (1935). However, it appears that Schedule
A-3 of those acts, the stock transfer tax, has no application to the transaction, since
the stock goes directly from the surviving or consolidated corporation to the stockholders
of the respective constituents without those constituents ever having any right to the
stock. Cf. i.nnesota Mlining and Mlfg. Co. v. Wilcuts, 2 F. Supp. 789 (D. Minn. 1932);
Westmoreland Coal Co. v. MlacLaughlin, 3 F. Supp. 963 (E. D. Pa. 1934). While not
involving true mergers or consolidations, the principles of these cases would seem to apply
to a merger or consolidation. These cases are discussed and criticized in Comment (1935)
44 YALz L. J. 1424. A slightly different problem in regard to stock transfer taxes arises
where a constituent owns stock in some other corporation. While the transfer from the
constituent to the surviving or consolidated corporation seems to involve a taxable trans-
fer, at least one case has held it not taxable under the New York stock transfer tax.
Rockefeller Foundation v. State, 144 Misc. 460, 258 N. Y. Supp. 812 (Ct. Claims, 1932).
122. State v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 364, 65 At. 40
(1905); People v. Rice, 57 Hun. 486, 11 N. Y. Supp. 249 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Carolina
Coach Co. v. Hartness, 198 N. C. 524, 152 S. E. 489 (1930).
123. Ohio & lMsissippi Rr. Co. v. Weber, 96 111. 443 (18S0); Chicago & E. I. Rr. Co.
v. State, 153 Ind. 134, 51 N. E. 924 (1898). Contra: State Treasurer v. Auditor General,
46 Mich. 224, 9 N. W. 258 (1881); People v. New York, C. & St. L. Rr. Co., 129 N. Y.
474, 29 N. E. 959 (1892); New York Central Rr. Co. v. Flynn, 233 App. Div. 123, 251
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However, statutes expressly restrict the tax to any increase in the capital stock
over the aggregate capital stocks of the constituents upon which the organiza-
tion tax had originally been paid.1 2 4  Upon a merger, the surviving corporation
will not be liable for such organization taxes or incorporation fees because no
new corporation is formed, but in most states the tax imposed on increases in
capital stock will partially achieve the same result, for the surviving corporation
invariably must increase its capital stock in order to effect the merger.
By the operation of most merger and consolidation statutes, the surviving
or consolidated corporation is endowed with all the rights, privileges, powers,
and franchises of its constituents, as well as with all their property, real, per-
sonal and mixed.12 5  Since the surviving or consolidated corporation succeeds
to all these solely by operation of law, no instruments of conveyance such as
deeds or bills of sale are necessary.126  Often this succession by operation of
law may be attended by incidents different from those attending an ordinary
transfer or assignment, for value or otherwise. For example, where a con-
stituent was lessee under a lease containing a clause rendering the lease non-
enforceable if assigned, it has been held that the consolidated corporation could
enforce the lease. 27 In regard to title to real estate the statutes frequently pro-
vide that it shall not revert or in any way be impaired by reason of the trans-
N. Y. Supp. 343 (1931). However, these latter cases have been ones where the tax
statute imposed the tax on corporations "organized" under the laws of that state, and
the courts have construed this to mean organized under the laws of that state alone, and
not to include the organization of a corporation under the concurrent legislation of sev-
eral states.
124. E.g. DELr. Rxv. Coox (1915) § 1985, as amended by Del. Laws 1929, c. 135
§ 20; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 556; PA, STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 1822 (e).
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Bosworth, 169 Ky. 824, 185 S. W. 125 (1916); cf. South-
ern Ill. Gas Co. v. Commerce Comm., 311 Ill. 299, 142 N. E. 500 (1924) (tax on issuance
of bonds).
125. E.g. ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 32, § 157.69(d), N. Y. STocX
CORP. Law (1923) § 89. The language of the different statutes varies, some including
"interests" and "immunities" as well as rights, privileges, powers, and franchises. Thus,
the surviving or consolidated corporation can sue on a guaranty or surety bond given to
the constituent, Bank of America of Cal. v. Granger, 115 Cal. App. 210, 1 P. (2d) 479
(1931); and can exercise any right that a constituent had possessed, such as that of
eminent domain, Smith v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 170 Ind. 382, 81 N. E.
501 (1907); Reeves v. Phila. Suburban Water Co., 287 Pa. 376, 135 AtI. 362 (1926);
of increasing its capital stock, Commonwealth v. Buffalo, R. & P. 4~y. Co., 207 Pa. 160,
56 Atl. 412 (1903); of doing intrastate business, State v. Roach, 267 Mo. 300, 184 S. W.
969 (1916); of filing a mechanics' lien, Chambers v. George Vassar's Sons & Co., 81 Misc.
562, 143 N. Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1913); and of indemnifying itself from an Insurer
of a constituent, Syracuse Lighting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 226 N. Y, 25, 122
N. E. 723 (1919).
126. See Commissioner v. Oswego Falls Corp., 71 F. (2d) 673, 616 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934);
Morris v. Interstate Iron & Steel Co., 257 Ill. App. 613, 620 (1930); Silversmiths Co. v,
Reed & Barton Corp., 199 Mass. 371, 375, 85 N. E. 433, 434 (1908).
127. Proprietors of Locks & Canals v. B. & M. Rr., 245 Mass. 52, 139 N. E. 839
(1923), error dismissed, 267 U. S. 573 (1925); Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. v. Potts,




action. 2 8 In some states it is required that a copy of the articles of merger or
consolidation be filed with the recorder of deeds in each county in which any
constituent had owned any real estate, and, in view of the desirability of keep-
ing the chain of title on record at all times, this does not seem to be an undue
burden to impose on the corporations desiring to merge or consolidate.i2
Moreover, it would seem advantageous for the surviving or consolidated
corporation to take some such steps even in the absence of statutory require-
ments in order to insure the marketability of its own title.
However, the surviving or consolidated corporation holds all such rights,
privileges, properties, and other interests of the constituents only in the same
right as did those respective constituents, and not in any higher right such as a
bona fide purchaser for value would have.m0 Where a constituent had been
granted some special right or exclusive privilege by the state, the surviving or
consolidated corporation can have no greater right. 31 Thus, if a constituent
had been granted a tax exemption in respect to its property, the surviving or
consolidated corporation may retain this exemption in reference to the property
contributed by that constituent, depending on the terms of the grant and the
terms of the merger and consolidation statute.132 Even this may be lost if the
surviving or consolidated corporation cannot comply with the terms of the
exemption.3 3 Moreover, in the case of a consolidation, if between the time
128. E.g. In. STAT. Am;. (Burns, Watson's Supp. 1929) § 4856(d); Tmm. CODE Arnr.
(Williams, 1934) § 3751. The Ohio Statute expressly provides for the transfer of title
to real estate owned by any constituent in another state "when permitted by the laws
of any other state2' Omo G=T. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 8623-71.
129. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 361b; IT.no CoDrA .w. (1932) § 29-151(3);
IND. STAT. ANi. (Burns, Watson's Supp. 1929) § 4856.1; L%. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932)
§ 1128; N. Y. Srocr CoP. LAW (1923) § S6(8); N. C. CODS A_,.:;. (Michie, 1931)
§ 1224a.
130. First Nat. Bank of Duncan v. Staley, 4 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925); First
Nat. Bank of Missoula v. Holding, 90 Mont. 529, 4 P. (2d) 709 (1931); Vilas v. Page,
106 N. Y. 439, 13 N. E. 743 (1887); cf. Charles v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 282 Fed.
983 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
131. Punxsutawney Borough v. T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 238 Pa. 23, 85 AUt.
1003 (1913). And in some cases the entire special privilege Will be destroyed. Storrs
v. Ghinger, 166 Md. 572, 171 Ati. 849 (1934).
132. Philadelphia & Wilmington Rr. Co. v. Maryland, 10 How. 376 (U. S. 1850);
Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139 (1885). While the latter case held that a tax
exemption was a "right and privilege" which passed to the consolidated corporation, later
cases indicate that use of the word "privilege" is insufficient to pass the exemption.
Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236 (1906); Wright v. Georgia Rr. & Banking
Co., 216 U. S. 420 (1910); and in Phoenix Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U. S.
174 (1896), it was held that the terms "immunity" or "exemption" must be in the
statute to transfer the tax exemption. See 15 FxLxTc=,m, op. cit. supra note 3, § 710I0.
133. Thus, where a grant stipulated that the constituent should never be subject to
any income tax except on any excess over a 10c return on its investment, and alho
provided that the constituent make an annual return of its income to the state, a com-
mingling of the properties of that constituent with properties of others pursuant to a
consolidation was held to work a forfeiture of the exemption, since it was impossible
thereafter to ascertain what part of the income of the consolidated corporation was prop-
erly allocable to the constituent to which the exemption had been granted. State v. Maine
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the exemption was granted and the time the consolidation took place, some
statute or constitutional provision had been passed prohibiting the grant of
such exemptions, the exemption is lost even as to the constituent's properties,
because upon consolidation the constituent is dissolved and the new corporation
created with reference to the laws existing at the time of the consolidation
1 84
The same result ensues upon a merger if the exemption belonged to a con-
stituent, because the surviving corporation can only be endowed with those
rights and privileges which could lawfully be conferred at the date of the
merger. But if the exemption belonged to the corporation which survived, it
is not lost insofar as the survivor's original properties are concerned. 18
A special problem arises where a constituent corporation has been named as
a fiduciary, such as an executor or a trustee1 80 At the present time the legal
effect of merger or consolidation in such a situation is not clear, because of
the innumerable factual situations which conceivably may arise and because
there are few judicial decisions thereon. Moreover, the matter has been further
complicated by the attempts of legislatures to deal specifically with the prob-
lem of succession of corporate fiduciaries by means of statutes, and as a result
there is always doubt as to whether the statutes will cover a given set of facts.
In the absence of such statutes, where a state bank or trust company merges or
consolidates with another state bank or trust company, the types of questions
likely to arise are whether the right of the constituent to act as fiduciary was
a right to which the surviving or consolidated corporation could succeed by
virtue of the merger or consolidation statute alone, 1 7 and whether the designa-
tion of a corporation as a fiduciary creates a relation too personal to be dele-
gated.138 The problem may become even more complex where a state bank has
merged or consolidated with a national bank under the McFadden Act of 1927,
which not only authorizes such mergers or consolidations, but also purports to
make the corporation resulting from the transaction succeed to any right to act
as fiduciary which any constituent had possessed.189 This act has been con-
Central Rr. Co., 66 Me. 488, 513 (1877); cf. St. Louis I. Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Berry, 41
Ark. 509 (1883).
134. Railroad Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499 (1877); Railroad Co. v. Georgia 98 U. S.
359 (1878); St. Louis, I. Mt. & S. Rr. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465 (1884); cf. Shaw v.
City of Covington, 194 U. S. 593 (1904) (exclusive privilege of supplying city with
electric power is lost); Yazoo & M. V. Rr. Co. v. Sunflower County, 125 Miss. 92, 87
So. 417 (1921) (unlocated right of way is lost).
135. Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460 (U. S. 1872); Central Rr. & Banking Co. v.
Georgia, 92 U. S. 665 (1875); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 250 U. S. S19
(1919); cf. Southwestern Rr. Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 676 (1875).
136. See Fruchtman, The Effect of Merger or Consolidation on the Suecession of
Corporate Fiduciaries (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 378, particularly for its discusion of the possl-
ble factual situations and of statutory provisions; Comment (1930) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray.
126.
137. Matter of Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912); Matter of Stikeman, 48
Misc. 156, 96 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1905).
138. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser, 264 Ill. 31, 105 N. E. 718 (1914).
139. 44 STAT. 1224 (1927), as amended 48 STAT. 190 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 34a
(1934).
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strued to authorize such succession only when not in contravention of state
law.' 40
Conwlusion. In the past the disadvantages of merger or consolidation in com-
parison with other devices for effecting combination have operated to restrict
its use. The principal disadvantage of merger or consolidation has been the
inadequacies of statutory authorization, either in the sense of no general
statutory provision for merger or consolidation at all, or no provision for the
merger or consolidation of corporations of different states."1 Aside from this
fact, other forms of combination possessed advantages over merger or con-
solidation. In comparison with the holding company device, merger or con-
solidation is less adaptable to local conditions, particularly in being unable to
avoid heavy state taxation upon foreign corporations in states in which the
surviving or consolidated corporation must do business; it results in the
permanent loss of the names and goodwills of at least some of the constituents;
it is more difficult to disorganize the unprofitable units of a large single cor-
poration than it is to dissolve single unprofitable subsidiaries; and the process
of bringing about a merger or consolidation involves more difficulties than those
encountered in creating a holding company structure4' Compared with a
sale of entire corporate assets, the disadvantages of merger or consolidation
center about the fact that the consent of the stockholders of each corporation
participating in the transaction must be obtained, while in a sale of assets, only
the consent of the stockholders of the selling corporation is necessary.?4 3 How-
ever, despite these disadvantages, within recent years there have been indica-
tions that the statutory merger and consolidation device is being and will be
used more widely as a means of combining corporations. Factors leading to
this increased use have been the tendency toward simplicity in corporate struc-
ture, in industrial as well as public utility fields;' "14 the fact that merger or
consolidation often proves to be a facile device by which to revamp the
financial structures of two or more corporations, either with or without any
connection with a true reorganization; the exemption since 1918 of mergers
and consolidations from the gain or loss provisions of the federal income tax;'
140. Ex parte Worcester County Nat. Bank, 279 U. S. 347 (1929), a~g with mcdifi-
cation, Worcester County Nat. Bank, Petitioner, 263 Mass. 444, 162 N. E. 217 (1923).
141. Of course, where there was no authority to merge or consolidate in the state
of which one constituent was a corporation, and there was such authority in the state of
which a second constituent was a corporation, the first constituent could reincorporate in
the latter state, and then the merger or consolidation could take place. However, this
extra step of reincorporation adds to the inconvenience of merger or consolidation.
142. Ow-ms, op. cit. supra note 1, at 383.
143. Field, supra note 3, at 241.
144. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 22, § 3, at 1, col. 5; id., Oct. 3, 1935, at 43, cols. 4, 5;
id. Oct. 24, 1935, at 31, col 4; BuRTcE=, op. cit. supra note 1, at 774, 780.
145. 40 STAT. 1060 (1918), as amended 43 STAT. 256 (1924), as amended 44 STAT. 12
(1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 934(h) (1) (A) (1928), as amended 48 SrTA. 705 (1934), 26 U. S.
C. A. § 112 (g) (1) (A) (1935). The 1934 Act may make the use of merger or consolida-
tion an even more desirable device in this respect, since it seems to dose up loop-holes
in the former acts. See (1935) 45 YA= L. J. 134.
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and finally, merger and consolidation appear to have had somewhat greater
immunity from attack under the Clayton Act than have other forms of
combination.'-4
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION TO AVOID PAYMENT OF
INCOME TAX
SncE 1918, Congress has provided that gains created by exchanges of prop-
erties in pursuance of corporate reorganizations shall not be recognized for
purposes of federal income taxation until those properties are subsequently
sold for cash.' The deferment of the recognition of such gains is allowed be-
cause it is feared that the taxation of mere paper gains may impede the
effectuation of normal business adjustments by reorganization. 2 But the com-
prehensive scope given to this exemption in Revenue Acts prior to 1934, for
the purpose of including therein virtually every possible type. of legitimate re-
organization,3 has made available to taxpayers a means of escaping taxation
on gains realized, by bringing within the exemption provisions, transactions
otherwise taxable in the year in which they are effected. 4 For, although the-
oretically the taxpayers will have thereby merely deferred the recognition of
their gains,5 the opportunity thus afforded them to elect the year in which to
report such gain in many cases leads to an actual avoidance of taxation.0
146. Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids any corporation to acquire the whole or any
part of the "share capital" of two or more corporations, where the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition between such corporations, restrain com-
petition in interstate commerce, or create a monopoly. It seems this section does not
apply to a merger or consolidation. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm., 291 U. S. 587 (1934). But insofar as the Sherman Act is concerned, any special
immunity of merger and consolidation is very doubtful. See Handler, Industrial Mergers
j.-Anti-Trust Laws (1932) 32 COL. L. Rzv. 179, 235, 266. Cf. Owzxs, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 384.
1. See Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STAT. 1060 (1919). For history of reorganization exmp-
tion provisions of various revenue acts since 1918 see Eisner, Taxation Affecting Corporate
Reorganization (1933) VIII LEcruRms ON LEGAL Topics 413; Hendricks, Taxation of Reorgan-
izations (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1198, 1209; Satterlee, The Income Tax Delnition of
Reorganization (1934) 12 TAx MAO. 639, 641.
2. See Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934) 59; H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. Ser. No. 8226 (1924) 13;
Miller, Corporate Reorganization (1934) 12 TAx MAo. 459, 462; Satterlee, supra note 1, at 646.
3. See Eisner, supra note 1, at 419; Hendricks, supra note 1, at 1209.
4. See Altman, Recent Developments in Income Tax Avoidance (1934) 29 ILL. L. REv.
154, 171; GREEN, THEORY AND PRACC OF MODERN TAXATIoN (1933) 117.
5. See § 113 (a) (6) of the Revenue Acts of 1928 (45 STAT. 818), and 1932 (47 STAT. 198).
This provision has been retained unchanged in the Revenue Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 706
(1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 113 (1935).
6. See Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934) 58, 60, 75.
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Consequently, the problem has often arisen under the 19287 and 19328 Acts,
and probably will continue so to arise for some time, of distinguishing between
a reorganization within the intent of the statutes, and one, which, although
technically an exempt reorganization is being utilized solely as a device to avoid
taxation on actual present gains.
Parts (A) and (B) of the definitions found in the Revenue Acts of 1928 and
1932 have, by reason of their inclusiveness been mainly responsible for making
it possible to disguise otherwise taxable transactions as reorganizations, and thus
obtain for them the exemptions provided by other provisions of the statutes.0
Part (A) defines "reorganization" as a merger or consolidation and by means
of a parenthetical addition includes therein as a type of merger and consolidation,
the acquisition by one corporation of substantially all the assets of another.Y°
Even though actually the transferor corporation may have merely sold all its
assets without any purpose of effecting a business reorganization, the transaction
would come within this definition of reorganization provided the transferor had
conveyed substantially all its assets.P Consequently, in accordance with the
statutory exemptions, if only stock or securities are received by the transferor
corporation in exchange for its assets, no gain to the corporation is recognized
at that time, and furthermore even though cash is included as part of the ex-
change, if this cash is distributed in pursuance of the alleged plan of reorganiza-
tion, then, too, no taxable gain will accrue as to the corporation.' The holders
of its outstanding stocks or securities will also realize no taxable gain by virtue
of the exemption, if they exchange their holdings for stocks or securities of the
purchasing corporation.' 3 Even when they receive cash as part of their exchange,
the amount of gain immediately recognized as resulting from the exchange can
not be in excess of the sum of such cash.'4
Part (B) of the statutory definitions of reorganization recognizes as a reorgan-
ization the mere transfer of assets by one corporation to another when the
transferor or its stockholders are in "control" of the transferee immediately after
the transfer.' 5 Section 112 (G) of the 1928 and 1932 Acts further permits stock-
7. 45 STAT. 816 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 2112 (1928).
8. 47 STAT. 196 (1932).
9. See § 112 of the Revenue Acts of 1928 (45 STAT. 816), and 1932 (47 ST",. 196).
Similarly extensive provisions are contained in the Revenue Acts of 1926 (44 STT. 12) and
1924 (43 STAT. 256). See also Hills, Reorganizations under the Revenue Act of 1934 (1934)
12 TAx MAIo. 411; Hendricks, supra note 1, at 1198, 1205, 1215; Note (1933) 33 COL. L. R1v.
1456.
10. § 112 (i) (1): "The term 'reorganization' means (A) a merger or consolidation
(including the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and
at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another
corporation, or substantially all the properties of another corporation).'
11. See Hill, supra note 9, at 411; Hearings Before Comrnintce on Ways and Means on
Revenue Revision 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 57.
12. § 112 (B) (4), (D) (1), 45 STAT. 816 (1928); 47 STAT. 197 (1932).
13. § 112 (B) (3). 14. § 112 (C).
15. § 112 () (1): "The term 'reorganization' means (A) . . ., or (B) a transfer by
one corporation of all or a part of its assets td another corporation if immediately after the
transfer, the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control" of the transferee. By
§ 112 (j) "control" is defined as the ownership of at least So of the voting stock and at
1935]
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holders of a participating corporation to receive stock of the transferee and at
the same time retain their original holdings in the transferor without being held
to have received taxable gain.10 By virtue of these provisions, corporations may
effect distributions of assets to their stockholders, without the latter incurring
the tax liability ordinarily involved in such distributions.' 7 In this type of case,
the asset to be distributed is first transferred to a specially organized corporation
in exchange for all of the latter's stock. Under part (B) of the definition, that
transaction is a reorganization. Therefore the stock of the new corporation can
then be distributed tax free to the transferor's stockholders. Thereafter the
latter can liquidate the new corporation, receiving their proportionate shares of
its assets as liquidating dividends. Since a liquidating dividend is treated for
federal income taxation purposes as a sale of the stock, the only taxable gain
thus created is the excess of that dividend over the basis for the shares in the
liquidated corporation.' 8 In view of the fact that that basis is determined by
apportioning the basis formerly applicable to the old shares between the old
and new shares in proportion to their respective values at the time of distribution
of the new corporation's shares, the gain immediately recognized and taxed is
far less than that which had actually accrued1 0
There is nothing on the face of the 1928 and 1932 Statutes that would serve
to withdraw these transactions, which literally satisfy all statutory requirements,
from the exemption provisions. For they make no attempt to distinguish be-
tween a reorganization carried through merely to gain the benefit of the exemption
and a bona fide corporate reorganization. It seems clear, however, that the
least 8017 of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
Besides parts (A) and (B) the definition contains two other parts: namely "(C) a recapital-
ization, or (D) a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization however effected."
16. § 112 (G), 45 STAT. 816 (1928) ; 47 STAT. 197 (1932).
17. See REPORT or COiM=TTEE ON WAYS Aim MEANS, REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sees.
(1934) 12; REPORT OF SENATE Co n=rr-m ON FIxANcE, REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Ses,
(1934) 16.
18. See*§ 115 (C), 45 STAT. 822 (1928); 47 STAT. 204 (1932).
19. See § 113 (A) (9). Then see U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, art. 600, rule 2 (1928) as amended
by T. D. 4427 viii-2 Cum. Bull. 240 (1929); U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 600 rule 2 (1932).
Thus corporation A, capitalized at $1,000,000 10,000 shares, had transferred its surplus of
$250,000 to Corporation B in exchange for all of the latter's stock. This stock had been
distributed to Corporation A's stockholders. X, a stockholder has one share in Corporation
A, cost $100, and now receives an additional share in Corporation B. When Corporation B
is liquidated, X receives $25. The basis applicable to the share in Corporation A, $100, is
allocated between that share and the new share in Corporation B in proportion to their
respective market values at the date of distribution, $100 and $25 respectively. Thus the
100
basis for the share in Corporation A is $80: - X 100 - 80, and the basis for the share in
125
25
Corporation B is $20: - X 100 - $20. Therefore X has now realized a taxable gain of125
only $5. See Evelyn F. Gregory, 27 B. T. A. 223, 226 (1932), citing MmLER, HENDRicxS AND
EvEPErr, REORGANIZATIONS AND O= ExcmAsoEs n; FEDERAL INcome, TAXAToz (1931)
316. Cf. David B. Gann, 23 B. T. A. 999 (1931) aff'd 61 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
But cf. Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Ses. (1934) 62,
Exhibit D, example no. 6.
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intent of Congress was to permit only the latter to go untaxed. The courts have
attempted to effectuate that intention and so prevent misuse of the exemption by
setting up certain criteria to differentiate between bona fide and fictitious re-
organizations.20
Thus it has been decided that the mere fact that substantially all 2' the assets
of one corporation have been transferred to another corporation is not of itself
sufficient to constitute the transaction a reorganization under the statute. -- In
the absence of the element of "control" of the transferee corporation which
would bring the transaction within part (B) of the definition, the process,
in order to come within part (A), must resemble or partake of the nature of a
merger or consolidation for the reason that, although part (A) is not strictly
limited to mergers and consolidations, it is fundamentally concerned with trans-
actions of that general character.P When attempting to define this "resemblance
to a merger or consolidation," the federal courts found that mergers and con-
solidations are usually characterized by the fact that the interests of those who
formerly owned the properties involved in the merger or consolidation are con-
tinued in those properties after the completion of the process. Accordingly, it
was held that before a transaction may come within part (A) of the definition,
there must be present a "continuance of interest" on the part of the transferor
in the properties transferred. 4
But no precise definition of "continuance of interest" exists.P Hence, the
problem remains of affording a meaning to this standard that will serve the pur-
20. See Eisner, supra note 1, at 419; Note (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1456, 1457; cf. Satterlee,
supra note 1, at 642.
21. "Substantially all" apparently means all the properties of any consequence as regards
value at the time the transaction takes place. Cf. The Western Industries Co., 30 B. T. A.
309 (1934), 85.27 held not substantially all); The National Pipe and Foundry Co, 19
B. TA. 242 (1930) (95% held substantially all). See also Hendricks, The Income Tax
Definition of Reorganization (1932) 45 HRv. L. Rav. 648, 655; Mzzja, Hannxcns A~m
Evmaanr, supra note 19, at 115.
22. Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 462 (1933); Sarther
Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
23. Cortlandt Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); cf.
Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Cormisoner, 57 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932)
modified in 287 U. S. 462 (1933).
24. Cortlandt Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) approved
in Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 462, 470 (1933). Further
support for this standard is found in the manner in which the term "reorganization" is
used in the related exchange provisions of Section 112. See § 112 (b) (3, 4), and § 112 (C)
(D). 45 StrA. 816 (1928); 47 StAr. 196 (1932). See also Minnesota Tea Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 76 F. (2d) 797, 802 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); The C. H. Mead Coal Co., 28 B. T. A.
599, 609 (1933), aff'd in part in 72 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
25. Dissolution of the transferor corporation has been offered as a further criterion of
"resemblance to a merger or consolidation." See the Minnesota Tea Co., 28 B. T. A. 591
(1933), rev'd 76 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 3th, 1935); John J. Watts, 28 B. T. A. 1056 (1933),
rev'd, 75 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). This standard is of little utility becaume in the
absence of continuity of interest, dissolution will not make the transaction an exempt re-
organization. Cf. The Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissoner, 237 U. S. 462
(1933). As to reasons for its inapplicability, see Hendricks, supra note 1, at 1211, 1214;
Miler, supra note 2, at 460.
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pose of preventing tax avoidance, and at the same time not contradict the express
pFr--isions of the statutes. It is, in the first place, evident that the interest
continued need not be a "controlling" interest in the transferee. 10 5 Part (B)
which requires "control," is distinct and separate from part (A) of the definition. 0
That these two provisions are intended to cover different situations is manifest
from the fact that a transferor may receive stock only in exchange for his assets,
and yet not obtain "control" of the transferee. To require "control" where the
transferor has conveyed substantially all its properties would render part (A)
entirely superfluous because all reorganizations under part (A) would then be
equally within part (B). In the second place, it seems clear that "continuance
of interest" cannot require continuation of exactly the same interests. A re-
quirement of that character would automatically exclude from the exemption
those exchanges in which the transferor receives any cash as part of the con-
sideration for its transferred assets. But the statutes specifically permit the
inclusion of cash in the exchange, and therefore by this provision recognize as
a reorganization an exchange where exactly the same interests are not continued? 7
Since these rigid requisites for "continuance of interest" are precluded by
reason of conflict with the provisions of the statutes, the courts have commonly
set up a general requirement of "some continuity of interest."28  But a standard
of this character frustrates the purposes for which "continuance of interest" was
formulated for the reason that it is too vaguely inclusive to offer an effectual
means of preventing tax avoidance. Therefore "some continuance of interest"
has apparently been defined to require the inclusion of voting common stock of
the transferee as part of the exchange for the transferred assets,20 and accord-
26. See C. H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 22, 27 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934);
Opinion of the General Counsel of Internal Revenue Bureau, G. C. M. 1753 VI-1 Cur. Bull.
(1927) 138, 139. Legislative history bears out the contention that parts (A) and (B)
represent separate alternative methods of reorganizing. See REPORT or Co imn oN
WAYS AND MEANs, REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) 16; Satterlee, supra note 1,
at 642.
27. § 112 (D), 45 STAT. 816 (1928); 47 STAT. 196 (1932). Moreover when properties
have been consolidated or merged, seldom can the interests of the constituent owners be
exactly the same as before. "For these assets have now become part of a greater mass of
properties, and one's interest in the latter will be different than it previously was with
respect to his individual part.
28. Cortlandt Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932);
Minnesota Tea Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
29. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Watts v.
Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 981, 982 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); cf. Keen and Woolf Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 49 F. (2d) 45, 46 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). But see G. & K. Manufacturing Co.
v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 454, 456 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). Inclusion of voting common
stock would not appear to be necessary to denote resemblance to a merger or consolidation.
See note 48, infra. But this requirement, however, serves the purpose of making it possible
to differentiate those transactions in which the speculative interest in the venture is disposed
of, and only bonds or notes are received in the exchange, from those in which the speculative
interest and a voice in the management of the transferee corporation are retained, apparently
for the reason that the former are more likely to be sales of assets disguised as reorganiza-
tions. Cf. the Cortlandt Specialty Co. v. Commissioner 60 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932);
Nelson v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 696, 698 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
ingly, the receipt of wholly bonds,30 notes,31 or non-voting preferred stock0 2 has
been held insufficient to constitute a continuance of interest. But there has
been no attempt to require the transferor to receive some minimum percentage of
total consideration in the form of the voting common stock, and without some
minimum, the criterion still may easily be reduced to a virtual nullity. For,
if it is held that no certain percentage is required, then any transaction in which
a transferor exchanges substantially all its properties for cash, notes, or bonds
plus a very small amount of voting stock may fulfill the requirement. Conse-
quently, corporate taxpayers might sell their assets for practically all cash, and,
after distributing that cash, still be permitted to defer recognition of the gains
resulting from the sale.
33
It therefore appears that if "continuance of interest" is to serve the purpose
for which it exists, it must necessarily be further restricted. Some such restric-
tion may be found in the requirement that there be a continuation of essentially
the same interests.&3 4 Although no definition may as yet be offered as to what
proportion of common stock is requisite to constitute continuance of essentially
the same interests, such a standard would seem to exclude from the exemption
those transactions where a substantial amount of cash, notes, or bonds is received
as part of the exchange. 35 Nevertheless in the recent case of Minnesota Tea
Co. v. Commissioner, the Circuit Court of Appeals expressly overruled the Board
of Tax Appeals' requirement of continuance of essentially the same interests,
and decided that the transferor cannot be required to receive any particular per-
centage of the stock of the transferee as a condition of coming within the
exemption.3 6
Even if the criterion of continuity of essentially the same interests might serve
to prevent the use of part (A) for other than legitimate reorganizations, it would
still be ineffective in those cases where the transferor corporation comes within
part (B) of the definition of reorganization by receiving all the stock of its
transferee in the exchange, and, by thus complying with the literal provisions of
30. Worcester Salt Co. v. Commissoner, 75 F. (2d) 251 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Frank
M. McNab, 33 B. T. A. No. 31, Oct. 11, 1935.
31. Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commiioner, 287 U. S. 462 (1933); Cortlandt
Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
32. Nelson v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
33. See Woodrough, Circuit Judge, dissenting in Minnesota Tea Co. v. Commissioner,
76 F. (2d) 797, S05 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
34. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 696, 698 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935). But see
Minnesota Tea Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 797, 802 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
35. The Board of Tax Appeals in the Ainnesota Tea Case, 28 B. T. A. 591 (1933) relied
on the standard of "continuity of essentially the same interets" to hold a tramaction in
which the exchange consisted of less than 60o in voting stock, the balance in cash, not a
reorganization. It was reversed in 76 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). This standard has
been criticized by one authority as presenting a highly metaphysical concept, and as re-
quiring "control" by the transferor. See Hendricks, supra note 1, at 1203, 1217. But on
examination continuance of essentially the same interests does not require "control" but
merely represents an advance in the degree of interest to be continued. See note (1933)
33 COL. L. REv. 1466, 1457.
36. 76 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); cf. Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Com-
missioner, 287 U. S. 462, 470 (1933).
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the statute, avoids the tax on corporate dividends." A further criterion is there-
fore required in such situations if tax avoidance by this device is to be halted.
In Gregory v. Helvering,3 7 the Supreme Court endeavored to supply that criterion.
The court in that case was confronted by a transaction that fully satisfied the
requirements of the statute, but held that in order. to be awarded the exemption,
the transaction alleged to be a reorganization must further have a corporate or
business purpose; it should not be a mere device to avoid taxation.
The doctrine of the Gregory case, though it renders certainty or predictability
impossible,38 does present a potentially effective means of preventing tax avoid-
ance. For the taxpayer's motives, whether to effect a business adjustment by
reorganization, or merely to evade taxation, may now be scrutinized and the
exemption accordingly awarded. But the Gregory case presented a peculiar set
of facts. There was in the record an open avowal by the taxpayer that the
sole purpose in employing the reorganization procedure was to avoid taxes, and
the case may therefore be easily distinguished from other and more usual fact
situations, where the direct avowal is absent and the purpose of the taxpayer is
therefore doubtful.3 9 Consequently the general utility and applicability of the
Gregory doctrine is yet to be demonstrated.
When formulating the reorganization exemption provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1934,40 Congress was aware of the extent to which this exemption was
being employed as a means of *tax avoidance, notwithstanding the judicial at-
tempts to prevent this abuse.4' In an effort to check such tax avoidance and
at the same time enable legitimate reorganizations to enjoy their previous immun-
ity, Congress in the Revenue Act of 1934 eliminated certain provisions of the
previous acts, and amended others. Such changes, would, of course, be applicable
only to transactions effected after the 1934 Act. Consequently, transactions
previously consummated under the 1928 and 1932 Acts, will probably continue
to be litigated under the provisions of those Acts, raising the problems previously
discussed.
Under the 1934 Act, the acquisition of substantially all the properties of a
corporation is not a reorganization for the purposes of federal income taxation,
unless the transferor receives the total consideration in voting stock of the trans-
feree.42 Hence, Congress has apparently incorporated in that section the
37. 293 U. S. 465 (1935) aff'g 69 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) which had reversed
27 B. T. A. 223 (1932), noted in (1935) 48 HARv. L. Rxv. 852; (1935) 23 CAM. L. REV. 641.
38. The decision has been widely criticized on this score. See Miller, supra note 1, at 459,
461, 462; Thompson, Step Reorganizations (1934) 12 TAx MAo. 356, 360; cf. Hendricks,
supra note 21, at 648. See also Treasury statement in Hearings Before Committee on Ways
and Means on Revenue Revision, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 59.
39. Cf. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Commissioner 76 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) and
Woodrough, Circuit Judge, dissenting, at 803; George H. Chisholm, 29 B. T. A. 1334 (1934).
40. 48 STAT. 704 (1934) ; 26 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1935).
41. A subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means recommended the elimination
of the reorganization exemption on the ground that "the abuses under the present policy far
outweigh the advantages.' Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue
Revision, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 58, 60, 75.
42. § 112 (G) (1), 48 STAT. 704 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1935): "The term
'reorganization' means (A) ... or (B) the acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely
for all or a part of its voting stock: of at least 80 per cent of the voting stock and at least
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standard of "continuity of essentially the same interests." Thus, an exchange
whose status under what formerly was part (A) of the definition in the 1928
and 1932 Acts was doubtful because it involved the receipt of cash, notes, bonds,
or preferred stock, is dearly not a reorganization under the new Act.
Although part (B) of the previous definition of reorganization is retained
unchanged in the 1934 Act,'0 it cannot now provide a means of making cor-
porate distributions that escape the taxes on dividends because the section which
exempted the receipt of additional stock in pursuance of a reorganization, not-
withstanding the retention of the old stocks,10 has been eliminated. 'When a
stockholder in one corporation now receives stock in another participating cor-
poration, a taxable gain will immediately result unless he has surrendered his
original holdings. 43 Consequently, although the corporation may by means of
a corporate reorganization effect a segregation of the asset which it desires to
distribute, its stockholders cannot obtain the control of this asset without being
subjected to the recognition of taxable gain. This amendment therefore, appears
to render unnecessary any future dependence upon the Gregory37 doctrine to
prevent tax avoidance in these cases.& "
Congress effected still a third change in the definition of reorganization for
the purposes of the exemption. The term "reorganization" is no longer gen-
erally defined as a "merger or consolidation" but is expressly limited to "statutory
merger or consolidations.145 Thus a merger or consolidation to be an exempt
reorganization must be effected in accordance with the merger and consolidation
laws of a state, territory, or district of Columbia. 40 Since a merger or consolida-
tion is necessarily statutory, Congress has here not introduced any additional
restriction, but has merely indicated more clearly the meaning to be attached to
"merger and consolidation." 4 7 It is possible, however, that in some cases the
problem will be raised as to whether a transaction that conforms to the state
statutory requirements is necessarily an exempt reorganization for the purposes
of federal income taxation. Some state merger and consolidation statutes permit
the distribution of wholly notes or bonds to the stockholders of the constituent
corporation in place of their original holdings.48 The argument might be made
80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation; or
of substantially all the properties of another corporation." Cf. note 10 supra.
43. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 112 (g)-5 (1934).
44. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, ArL 112 (a) (1); Art. 112 (g) (1) (1934).
45. § 112 (G) (1): "The term 'reorganization' means (A) a statutory merger or con-
solidation" 48 STAT. 704 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1935).
46. U. S. Treas. Reg., Art. 112 (g)-2 (1934). No reason appears why the federal statutea,
which authorize certain types of mergers and consolidations are not included. See Hilb,
supra note 9, at 412; Hendricks, supra note 1, at 1199n.
47. See Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J., 105, for exhaustive discu-ion of the nature
of a statutory merger or consolidation. See also Hills, supra note 1, at 411, 412.
48. See, E.g., Apx. Dric. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1931) § 170112: "The agreement
may provide for the distribution of cash, notes or bonds in whole or in part, in lieu of
stock to the stockholders of the constituent corporations or any of them." See also CAL.
Cm. CoD (Deering, 1931) § 361; F"A Comm. Gm. LAws A m. (1927) § 6562; Nnv. Co!.W.
LAws (Hillyer, 1930) § 1638; Omo Gm. Coon (Page, Supp., 1935) § 8623-67; T=m. Corr
AwN. (Williams, 1934) § 3750. Cf. ILr. REv. STAT. (Cahill & Moore, 1935) c. 32 § 62, and




that such exchanges are not exempt reorganizations because under the decisions
of the federal courts, there is no "continuity of interest." On the other hand,
however, it might be pointed out that the criterion of continuity of interest was
formulated in order to determine whether a transfer of substantially all the assets
of a corporation sufficiently resembled a merger and consolidation when it tech-
nically was not such, and that when the transaction fully satisfies every formal
requisite of a true merger or consolidation, 49 the standard is unnecessary. In
the event that the transaction before the court is really a sale of assets disguised
as a statutory merger or consolidation, then the purpose for which the merger
or consolidation was effected may be examined and the exemption allowed or
denied in accordance with the doctrines developed in the Gregory case.3
RIGHT OF INTERSTATE CARRIER TO COLLECT
UNDERCHARGES
I
THE Interstate Commerce Act prohibits interstate carriers by land from
charging or collecting any rates for transportation or other services different
from those on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission or from refunding
or remitting any portion of such rates by any device.' To effectuate these
provisions of the Act aimed at discrimination by the carriers, the courts have
established the broad principle that interstate carriers cannot be estopped by
their own mistakes or negligence to collect the full legal rate from any person
liable therefor.2 This principle has been applied regardless of any intent to
accomplish a discrimination both because it is felt that an inflexible rule will
most effectively eliminate purposeful discrimination3 and because even unin-
49. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 112 (g)-1 (1934), setting up the requirement of con-
tinuity of interest for all reorganizations.
1. 34 STAT. 587 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. § 6(7) (1926).
2. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919);
Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59 (1924). And tho
Interstate Commerce Commission has ruled that the carrier must exhaust its legal remedics
to collect such rate. I. C. C. Conference Ruling No. 314, Bulletin No. 7, issued Aug. 1, 1917.
Apparently the only escapes are the running of the three-year statute of limitations [43
STAT. 633 (1924), 49 U. S. C. A. § 16, par. 3(a) (1926); Strawberry Growers Selling Co.,
Inc., v. American Railway Express Co., 31 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Vicksburg,
S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Paup, 47 F. (2d) 1069 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931)] and possibly the fraud of
the carrier [American Express Co. v. Sweeney, 283 Fed. 691 (D. Mass. 1922)].
The only protection against misquotation of rates available to a person assuming a
liability for freight charges is to make a written request to an agent of the carrier for a
written statement of the lawful rates applicable to a given shipment. If the carrir then
makes a misstatement which results in damage to the person requesting the statement, It
becomes liable to the United States for a penalty. 36 STAT. 548 (1910), 49 U. S. C. A, §
6(11) (1926). But this affords no remedy to the person injured; it simply supplies an
incentive to the carrier to exercise care to avoid mistakes.
3. See Robinson, The Field Rate in Public Utility Law: A Study in Mechanical Jurls.
prudence (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 213.
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tentional discrimination is considered objectionable. Overzealous judicial ef-
forts to maintain this rule, however, have often resulted in hardship to in-
dividual shippers in cases in which its application tends to defeat rather than
to execute the policy of the Act.
II
In order to understand the effect of the rule that the carrier cannot be
estopped to collect the full legal rate it is first essential to examine the liability
of persons served by the carrier for its charges.
Liability of Consignee. If the consignee is the owner of the goods or the
person on whose behalf the shipment is made, he is liable for the lawful
charges as undisclosed principal of the person ordering the shipment.5 But even
if he does not fall within this rule, any consignee accepting delivery of the
goods becomes liable on a contract implied in law to pay the lawful charges
in return for the carrier's releasing its lien upon the goods by delivery.0 Prior
to the enactment of the Newton Amendment 7 the United States Supreme Court
had held in New York Central & Hudson River. Rr. Co. v. York & Whitney
Co.8 that this liability arising from acceptance of the goods could not be
avoided even though the consignee was a commission merchant acting only as
agent for the shipper and though the carrier had notice of that fact.
Under the rule of that case any consignee accepting delivery dearly became
liable to the carrier for any undercharge arising from a mistake as to the lawful
rates in spite of any stipulation made at the time of acceptance that the carrier
should look only to the consignor for any charges other than those then de-
manded which might subsequently be found to be due.0 Where, however, the
mistake was as to the amount which had been collected prior to delivery rather
than as to the lawful rates, a few courts have held that the carrier is estopped
4. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919);
Davis, Director General of Railroads, v. Timmonsville Oil Co., 285 Fed. 470 (C. C. A. 4th,
1922); Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 20 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927), aff'g 14 F. (2d) 123 (D. Blnn. 1926), noted in (1927) 27 COT. L. RM.. 89;
(1920) 15 ILL. L. REV. 102. But cf. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Republic Box Co.,
12 F. (2d) 441 (S. D. Tex. 1926).
5. Southern Flour & Grain Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 22 Ga. App. 403, 95 S. E. 997
(1918); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Parry, 66 Pa. Super. 49 (1917); (1917) 17 Cor.
L. REv. 553; Comment (1930) 28 MacH. L. Rv. 910. But cf. Davis v. City Fuel Co., 157
Ark. 455, 248 S. W. 572 (1923); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co. v. Evans, 221 Mo.
App. 757, 288 S. W. 73 (1926).
6. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577 (1919).
7. 44 SrAT. 1447, 49 U. S. C. A. § 3 (2) (1927).
8. 256 U. S. 406 (1921).
9. Western & Atlantic Rr. Co. v. Underwood, 281 Fed. 891 (N. D. Ga. 1922); Westei
Grain Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 56 F. (2d) 160 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); cf.
Callaway v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 35 F. (2d) 319 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (consignee




to collect any undercharges thereby resulting.10 The theory of these cases
seems to be that the reason for refusing to allow an estoppel in the cases in-
volving mistake as to rates is that the consignee has constructive notice of the
filed tariffs and therefore is not entitled to rely upon a representation as to
their contents, a reason inapplicable to the cases involving mistake as to the
amount collected, since the carrier is the most reliable source of information
about such collections.'1 But this distinction does not seem well taken, for it
misapprehends the reason for refusing an estoppel, which is to close up any
loophole for making rebates. The prohibited undercharge will just as certainly
have been made where the "mistake" takes the form of false representation of
the amount collected as where it results from erroneous computation of rates.1 2
Some courts, apparently desiring to limit the rule of the York & Whitney
case, have confined its application by a narrow and technical definition of the
term consignee. The rule dearly applies to the person named in the bill of
lading as consignee,' 3 or to his assignee,' 4 if he accepts the goods. However,
10. Davis v. Akron Feed & Milling Co., 296 Fed. 675 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924), noted In
(1924) 34 YALE L. 1. 200; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. McKen-
zie Lumber Co., 112 Ohio St. 80, 147 N. E. 8 (1925), noted in (1925) 20 IL., L. RLV.
372; Cincinnati Northern Ry. Co. v. Beveridge, 8 F. (2d) 372 (E. D. Va. 1925) semble.
Contra: Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Hyder, 279 Fed. 783 (W. D. Wash. 1922); Western
& Atlantic Rr. Co. v. Underwood, 281 Fed. 891 (N. D. Ga. 1922); Central Warehouse
Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 20 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), aff'g 14 F. (2d)
123 (D. Minn. 1926), noted in (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 89; Strong v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 123 Kans. 161, 254 Pac. 405 (1927); New York, New Haven & Hartford Rr.
Co. v. Lord & Spencer, Inc., 273 Mass. 583, 174 N. E. 179 (1931); Houston & Texas Cen-
tral Rr. Co. v. Johnson, 41 S. W. (2d) 14 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1931), noted in (1931)
18 VA. L. REv. 200; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Williamson Grocery Co., 103 W. Va.
532, 138 S. E. 102 (1927); Waters v. Pfister & Vogel Leather Co., 116 Wis. 16, 186 N. W.
173 (1922).
11. Davis v. Akron Feed & Milling Co., 296 Fed. 675 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924), noted In
k1924) 4 YALE L. J. 200; Cincinnati Northern Rr. Co. v. Beveridge, 8 F. (2d) 372 (E. D.
Va. 1925); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. McKenzie Lumber Co.,
112 Ohio St. 80, 147 N. E. 8 (1925), noted in (1925) 20 ILL. L. REV. 372.
12. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Hyder, 279 Fed. 783 (W. D. Wash. 1922); New York,
New Haven & Hartford Rr. Co. v. Lord & Spencer, Inc., 273 Mass. 583, 174 N. E. 179
(1931); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Williamson Grocery Co., 103 W. Va. 532, 138 S.
E. 102 (1927).
13. Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. Belson & Lurie, 237 III. App. 425 (1925); Davis, Direc-
tor General of Railroads v. Moody, 203 Ky. 203, 261 S. W. 1101 (1924); Louisville &
Nashville Rr. Co. v. Perry Ice & Bottling Co., 226 Ky. 286, 10 S. W. (2d) 1091 (1928);
Transmarine Corp. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 127 Misc. 812, 216 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Sup.
Ct. 1926); Director General of Railroads v. McCormack, 82 N. H. 528, 136 Atl. 253
(1927); Southern Ry. Co. v. Calhoun Twine Mill, 180 S. E. 557 (S. C. 1935); Houston
& Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Ahlers, 274 S. W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
14. Dare v. New York Central Rr. Co., 20 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), noted In
(1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 95; Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 2a
F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), aff'g 14 F. (2d) 123 (D. Minn. 1926), noted in (1927)
27 COL. L. REv. 89; Case v. Union Pacific Rr. Co., 119 Kans. 706, 241 Pac. 693 (1925) ,
New York Central Rr. Co. v. Hendel, 123 Misc. 907, 207 N. Y. Supp. 234 (City Ct. 1924).
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there are decisions refusing to apply it to notify-parties'0 or to persons to whom
the carrier has been directed to make delivery.1 0 But these cases reflect a dis-
like of the rule, rather than enunciate a distinction based upon reason, for it
was the surrender of the lien by delivery of possession which formed the basis
of liability in the York & Whitney case. The designation of the person to
whom delivery was made as consignee in the bill of lading seems immaterial.
Where the consignee accepting delivery of the goods is "an agent only, and
has no beneficial title in the property" and gives notice in writing to that effect
to the carrier prior to delivery,7 the Newton Amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act relieves him from the liability imposed by the rule of the York &
Whitney case for charges other than those. billed against him at the time of
delivery.7 This clearly affords relief to the sales agent or commission merchant.
It ought not, however, to be applied to a consignee who has actually purchased
goods f. o. b .point of destination, for while he might easily be held to have
no "beneficial title" in the property prior to delivery,' 7 he could hardly establish
that he is an "agent only."
Liability of shipper. It seems to be assumed that there must be at least one
person liable to the carrier for the lawful charges in order to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Interstate Commerce Act.' 8 Since it had been held that a
consignee accepting the goods did assume such a liability,10 the result was
easily reached that the consignor might contract with the carrier that he should
not be liable for the charges if the consignee accepted the goods, for the in-
escapable liability of the accepting consignee was sufficient 2 Apparently,
then, the shipper need only become liable as guarantor of acceptance by the
consignee;' 8 he must undertake to pay any difference between the lawful charges
and the proceeds of a sale of the goods in satisfaction of the carrier's lien in the
event of the consignee's refusal to accept delivery.
15. Davis, Director General of Railroads, v. Ducote, 145 So. 717 (La. App. 1933).
Contra: Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 20 F. (2d) 828 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1927), aff'g 14 F. (2d) 123 (D. Binn. 1926), noted in (1927) 27 Cor. L. REv.
89; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Gilliam, 212 Ala. 120, 101 So. 859
(1924), noted in (1925) 23 McH. L. REv. 657.
16. Smith Bros. Co. v. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co., 36 Ga. App. 420, 137
S. E. 115 (1927); Cincinnati Northern Rr. Co. v. Beveridge, 8 F. (2d) 372 (E. D. Va.
1925) semblk. Contra: Chicago Great Western Rr. Co. v. Schmit, 163 Main. 194, 203
N. W. 618 (1925); Erie Railroad Co. v. H. Rosenstein, Inc., 249 N. Y. 241, 164 N. E.
37 (1928), noted in (1929) 29 CoT. L. REv. 521, (1928) 37 YA.E L. J. 939; Southern
Ry. Co. v. Herndon, 175 S. C. 361, 179 S. E. 305 (1935).
17. But the only holding on the point is to the contrary. Western Grain Co. v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 56 F. (2d) 160 (C. C. A. Sth, 1932).
18. See Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co, 265 U. S. 59, 63
(1924).
19. See p. 143, supra.
20. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59, 63 (1924).
But cf. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Glogora Coal Co., 113 W. Va. 796, 169 S. E. 471
(1933) (such a contract cannot be made when the lawful tariff requires prepayment).
Perhaps liability cannot be escaped if the consignor is owner of the goods. Cf. New
York Central Rr. Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Pa., 53 F. (2d) 1056 (W. D. Pa. 1931).
Contra: Michigan Central Rr. Co. v. Saginaw Milling Co., 262 N. W. 425 (Mich. 1935).
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The actual liability assumed must, therefore, be determined by the contract
between the shipper and the carrier, which is ordinarily embodied in the bill of
lading. The uniform bill of lading prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission contains a "no recourse" blank to be signed by the shipper if he
is to be released from liability in case the carrier surrenders its lien without
requiring payment of the charges.21  It has been suggested that the only
method now available to the shipper for avoiding liability is to sign this
blank.22  This probably goes too far,23 but only one case has been found re-
lieving the shipper from liability when he has signed such a bill of lading as
consignor without filling in the "no recourse" blank. 24  In the absence of a
specific contract provision limiting .his liability the shipper is presumed to be
liable as the owner of the goods and the person on whose behalf and under
whose direction the shipment is being made. 25  This presumption is said to be
rebuttable, but the cases hold the shipper liable even though he did not own the
goods, unless he disclosed that fact and did nothing to indicate that he was
21. On the back of the bill of lading is this provision:
"Sec. 7: The owner or consignee shall pay the freight or average, if any, and all other
lawful charges accruing on said property; but, except in those instances when It may
be lawfully authorized to do so, no carrier by railroad shall deliver or relinquish posses-
sion at destination of the property covered by this bill of lading until all tariff rates and
charges thereon have been paid. The consignor shall be liable for the freight and all other
lawful charges, except that if the consignor stipulates, by signature, in the space pro-
vided for that purpose on the face of this bill of lading that the carrier shall not make
delivery without requiring payment of such charges and the carrier, contrary to such
stipulation, shall make delivery without requiring such payment, the consignor shall not
be liable for such charges. Nothing herein shall limit the right of the carrier to require
at time of shipment the prepayment or guarantee of the charges. .. .
On the face of the bill of lading:
"If this shipment is to be delivered to the consignee without recourse on the consignor,
the consignor shall sign the following statement:
"The carrier shall not make delivery of this shipment without payment of freight and
all other lawful charges. (See section 7 of conditions).
................ .o ........ ... ,.
(Signature of consignor)
Even signing this blank has been held ineffective to relieve the consignor from liability
when he was owner of the goods. New York Central Rr. Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Pa.,
53 F. (2d) 1066 (W. D. Pa. 1931). Contra: Michigan Central Rr. Co. v. Saginaw Mill-
ing Co., 262 N. W. 425 (Mich. 1935).
22. Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Cross, 96 W. Va. 666, 123 S. E. 572 (1924); cf. Penn-
sylvania Rr. Co. v. Marcelietti, 256 Mich. 411, 240 N. W. 4 (1932); Chicago Junction
Ry. Co. v. Duluth Log Co., 161 Minn. 466, 202 N. W. 24 (1925); Grand Trunk Western
Rr. Co. v. Markis, 142 Misc. 807, 255 N. Y. Supp. 443 (Mun. Ct. 1932).
23. Cf. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59 (1924);
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Republic Box Co,, 12 F. (2d) 441 (S. D. Tex. 1926);
T. S. Faulk Co. v. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Ry. Co., 21 Ala. App. 617, 111
So. 196 (1926), cert. denied, 215 Ala. 488, lil So. 199 (1927); Moss Lumber Co. v.
Michigan Central Rr. Co., 219 Ala. 593, 123 So. 90 (1929).
24. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. American Salvage & Supply Co.,
15 S. W. (2d) 25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
25. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U. S. 59 (1924),
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contracting as principal.2 6 Nor is he relieved from liability by reason of the
carrier's releasing the goods to the consignee without requiring payment, despite
the fact that the bill of lading contains the provision "owner or consignee pay-
ing freight" and that the Interstate Commerce Act requires collection of the
charges before delivery,27 for these provisions are construed as intended for the
benefit of the carrier only.28
Reconsignment. When the original consignee reconsigns the shipment to
another destination, additional problems arise. The ultimate consignee ac-
cepting the goods is dearly liable for all the charges under the rule of the
York & Whitney case unless he brings himself within the Newton Amendment,
which provides that his notice of agency and lack of beneficial title must con-
tain in addition the name and address of the beneficial owner.7 The original
shipper is also dearly liable as consignor for the charges up to the original
destination or to the point of diversion, unless he has relieved himself from
such liability by special contract. -9
26. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Vredenburgh Sawmill Co.,
13 Ala. App. 442, 69 So. 228 (1915); T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louis-
vile Ry. Co., 21 Ala. App. 617, 111 So. 196 (1926), cert. denied, 215 Ala. 488, 111 So.
199 (1927); New York Central Rr. Co. v. Frank H. Buck Co., 2 Cal. (2d) 384, 41 P.
(2d) 547 (1935); New York Central PRr. Co. v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 131 AU. 111
(N. J. Sup. 1925); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Lovell, 111 Mlisc. 735, 180 N. Y. Supp.
922 (Mun. Ct. 1919); Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. General Crushed Stone Co., 76 Pa. Sup-r.
186 (1921); Director General of Railroads v. Birdsboro Stone Co., 86 Pa. Super. 587
(1926); Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rr. Co. v. Andrews Brothers Co., Inc., go
Pa. Super. 574 (1927); Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rr. Co. v. Ludwig, 94 Pa.
Super. 289 (1928); Montpelier & Wells River Rr. v. Charles Bianchi & Sons, 95 Vt. 31,
113 At]. 534 (1921), noted in (1922) 6 MmaT. L. REv. 316; Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v.
Backhannon River Coal & Coke Co., 77 W. Va. 309, 87 S. E. 376 (1915). But cf. Yazoo
& M. V. R. Co. v. Zemurray, 238 Fed. 789 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917), noted in (1917) 17
COL. L. Rv. 553, (1917) 30 HARV. L. Rav. 760; Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Johnson
Battle Lumber Co., 37 Ga. App. 729, 141 S. E. 678 (1928).
27. 41 STAT. 479 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3(2) (1926).
28. Main Island Creek Coal Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 23 F. (2d) 248 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1928); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hunt Bros. Fruit Co., 34 F. (2d) 582
(W. D. Mo. 1929); New York Central Rr. Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Pa., 53 F. (2d) 1056
(W. D. Pa. 1931); Moss Lumber Co. v. Michigan Central Dr. Co., 219 Ala. 593,
123 So. 90 (1929); Missouri Pacific Rr. Co. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 166 Ark. 226, 266
S. W. 82 (1924); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 28 Ga. App. 639, 112 S. E.
652 (1922); New York Central Rr. Co. v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 286
11. 267, 121 N. E. 581 (1919), afPg 210 IM. App. 267 (1918), noted in (1920) 15 Ir.
L. Rxv. 102; Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. Duluth Log Co., 161 Minn. 466, 202 N. W. 24
(1925); Yazoo & M ssissdsppi Valley Rr. Co. v. Picher Lead Co., 190 S. W. 387 (Mo. App.
1917); Davis, Director General of Railroads, v. Ford, 193 N. C. 444, 137 S. E. 328 (1927);
Montpelier & Wells River Rr. v. Charles Bianchi & Sons, 95 Vt. 81, 113 At]. 534 (1921),
noted in (1922) 6 MNn. L. Rxv. 316; Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Backhannon River Coal &
Coke Co., 77 W. Va. 309, 87 S. E. 376 (1915); Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Cros, 96
W. Va. 666, 123 S. E. 572 (1924).
29. Cf. Pere Marquette Rr. Co. v. American Coal & Supply Co., 239 Ill. App. 139
(.1925); S. A. Gerrard Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rr. Co., 39 Ohio App.
84, 176 N. E. 126 (1930).
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It is the liability of the original consignee that has caused most of the dif-
ficulty. He should, of course, be considered as consignor of the reshipment
and be held liable as such for the additional charges resulting from the re-
shipment unless he has contracted for an exemption from liability8 0 The real
stumbling block is his liability for the charges which had accrued at the time
of the reconsignment order. If he is the owner and has authorized the ship-
ment, he should be held as the person receiving the benefit of the carrier's
services. 1 But even in the absence of such a basis for holding him, there is
substantial authority to the effect that simply making the reconsignment order
is such an act of dominion over the goods as to amount to a constructive ac-
ceptance of the shipment and thus bring him within the rule of the York &
Whitney case.32 This result does not seem warranted by the rule, for the basis
30. Pere Marquette Rr. Co. v. American Coal & Supply Co., 239 Il. App. 139 (1925);
New York Central Rr. Co. v. Satuloff, 122 Misc. 119, 202 N. Y. Supp. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
S. A. Gerrard Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Rr. Co., 39 Ohio App. 84, 176
N. E. 126 (1930); Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rr. Co. v. Andrews Brothers Co.,
Inc., 90 Pa. Super. 574 (1927); Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Rothstein, 116 Pa. Super. 156,
176 At]. 861 (1935); cf. Chesapeake & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Southern Coal, Coke & Mining
Co., 254 Ill. App. 238 (1929), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 860 (1930) (terms of contract held
to relieve consignee of liability).
31. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Horn, 40 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930); New York Cen-
tral Rr. Co. v. Satuloff, 122 Misc. 119, 202 N. Y. Supp. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
32. New York Central Rr. Co. v. Platt & Brahm Coal Co., 236 Ill. App. 150 (1925);
Andrew W. Mellon, Director General of Railroads, v. Landeck, 248 Ill. App. 353 (1928);
Central Rr. Co. of New Jersey v. National Asbestos Mfg. Co., 127 Atl. 184 (N. J. Sup.
Ct. 1925) (though reconsignment was return of goods to original consignor); C. L. Hils
Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co., 28 Ohio App. 459, 162 N. E. 761 (1928) (agency,
if any, was undisclosed); West Jersey & Seashore Rr. Co. v. Whiting Lumber Co., 71 Pit.
Super. 161 (1919); Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Rothstein & Sons, 109 Pa. Super. 96, 165
Atl. 752 (1933). Contra: Chicago, Indiana & Southern Rr. Co. v. D. E. McMillan &
Brother Coal Co., 207 Ill. App. 58 (1917); Pere Marquette Rr. Co. v. American Coal
& Supply Co., 239 Ill. App. 139 (1925); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Southern Coal,
Coke & Mining Co., 254 Ill. App. 238 (1929), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 860 (1930).
The same result has been reached as to the effect of making delivery orders. New
York Central Rr. Co. v. Frank H. Buck Co., 2 Cal. (2d) 384, 41 P. (2d) 547 (1935);
New York Central Rr. Co. v. Warren Ross Lumber Co., 234 N. Y. 261, 137 N. E.
324 (1922), noted in (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 751, (1923) 71 U. or PA. L. REV. 390;
New York Central Rr. Co. v. Maloney, 137 Misc. 751, 244 N. Y. Supp. 394 (Co. Ct.
'930). Contra: New York Central Rr. Co. v. Sharp, 124 Misc. 265, 206 N. Y. Supp.
755 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 213 N. Y. Supp. 867 (4th Dep't, 1925), noted in (1925) 38
HAv. L. REV. 824 (defendant was notify-party).
Also as to assignment of bill of lading. New York Central Rr. Co. v. Stanziale, 105
N. J. L. 593, 147 AfU. 457 (1929), rev'g 6 N. J. Misc. 1116, 143 Atl. 834 (1928), noted
in Comment (1930) 28 Mzcn. L. Rv. 910. Contra: Wallingford Bros. v. Bush, 255 Fed.
949 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), noted in (1919) 19 CoL. L. Rv. 500; Davis, Director
General, v. Richardson, 87 Pa. Super. 205 (1926).
See, also, Davis v. City Fuel Co., 157 Ark. 455, 248 S. W. 572 (1923) (goods were con-
signed by defendant's vendor to purchaser from defendant; defendant held not liable).
Probably the question is not necessarily involved in most of the cases discussing It,
for the typical case is one in which the ultimate consignee has refused the goods and suit
is brought by the carrier against the original consignee for the difference between the total
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of the liability imposed by the rule is the release of the carrier's lien by de-
livery of the goods, and that basis is lacking in these cases, the carrier retaining
its lien until delivery is made to the ultimate consignee.n3
III
Thus it may be seen that in many cases both shipper and consignee may be
liable to the carrier for undercharges, affording the carrier a choice of parties
from whom to collect. Ultimate liability between shipper and consignee for
the charges, however, is determined by a contract to which the carrier is not a
party. So long as both remain solvent, there is no serious objection to allowing
the carrier a choice of collecting from either, for if the carrier collects from the
party not ultimately liable, the latter will be able to recover over against the
party ultimately liable.34 But if the party ultimately liable becomes insolvent
before the undercharge is collected, it seems hard to hold the other party, leav-
ing him without effective remedy to recover a loss which he will have suffered
if he has sold the goods at a price reckoned on the basis of the amount orginally
demanded by the carrier or has settled his account with the party ultimately
liable on that basis.
Nor is such a result necessary to effectuate the policy of the Interstate Com-
merce Act against discrimination. Normally the only person receiving any ad-
vantage from a rebate is the one who as between shipper and consignee is ulti-
mately liable for the charges. To exempt the other party from liability can-
not, therefore, operate as a discrimination in his favor?5 Indeed, if he is held
liable at a time when he cannot recoup his loss against the other party, the
result is a discrimination against him because he is forced to bear alone a loss
to the carrier arising from insolvency, which in other fields is regarded as a cost
of the business and distributed among all the customers.
charges and the amount realized from a sale of the goods in satisfaction of the carrier's
lien. This difference will ordinarily be not more than the additional charges accruing by
reason of the reconsignment, for which the original consignee may be held as conzignor
of the reshipment.
33. In accord with this theory is the holding that the Newton Amendment, when
it refers to a consignee accepting delivery, does not apply to a consignee making a recon-
signment order. Pennsylvania Rr. v. Rothstein & Son, 109 Pa. Super. 96, 165 AUt. 752
(1933); cf. Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Rothstein, 116 Pa. Super. 156, 176 At. S61 (1935).
While it is true that the lien may become inadequate security by reason of the addi-
tional charges involved in the reconsignment, the appropriate method for the carrier to
avoid this risk is to refuse to comply with the reconsignment order until the charges
which it involves are paid.
34. There is, of course, the theoretical objection of circuity of action. But in prac-
tice collection will be made without litigation except in the insolvency cases. See Hooh, J.,
dissenting, in Wallingford Bros. v. Bush, 256 Fed. 949, 951 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), noted
in (1919) 19 CoL. L. Rxv. 500.
35. There is a possible theoretical exception to this statement. A manufacturer-
shipper not ultimately liable for the charges may receive an indirect advantage from a
rebate given to its distributors in the form of larger sales resulting from the lower prices
to consumers made possible by the rebate. This advantage would be even more appar-
ent in cases where the distributors are subsidiaries of the manufacturer. But the poi-n,-
bility seems too indirect and remote to deserve judicial recognition, especially since lia-
bility on the part of the shipper can be avoided by signing the "no recourse" blanL.
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This situation could be obviated by the courts' looking to the contract be-
tween shipper and consignee and holding that the rule refusing to allow an
estoppel against the carrier to collect the undercharges was limited to cases
against the party ultimately liable on that contract. Such a limitation on the
rule would not open the way to additional devices for violation of the prohibi-
tion against rebating, and it would eliminate the cases of hardship resulting
from the present inflexible application of the rule. Furthermore, while it may
be true that such a rule would result in greater losses to carriers from failure to
collect undercharges, nevertheless that objection would seem immaterial since
the purpose of prohibiting rebating is not to relieve carriers of the burden of
such losses and throw it instead on individual shippers, but rather to prevent
discrimination between shippers. The result would be that where the consignee
was an agent of the shipper or had purchased goods f. o. b. point of destination,
he could raise an estoppel against the attempt of the carrier to collect under-
charges; a shipper could do the same if he did not own the goods when shipped
or if he had sold them f. o. b. point of shipment. It would be immaterial who
paid the carrier the amount demanded before the mistake was discovered, for
any payment made by the other party would be a payment on account of the
party ultimately liable and not proof that the party paying was ultimately
liable.
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